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Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastelen, kuinka epävarmuus hallituksen politiikasta ja taloudellinen yh-
tenäistyminen vaikuttavat osaketuottojen yhtenäisyyteen Euroopan Unionissa. Tarkastelujaksoni 
sisältää vuodet 1990-2015. Käytän tutkimuksessani uutta talouspolitiikan epävarmuuden indeksiä, 
jonka ovat kehittäneet Baker, Bloom ja Davis (2015). Tulokset osoittavat, että osaketuotot jäsen-
maiden välillä ja sisällä liikkuvat yhtenäisemmin, kun epävarmuus talouspolitiikasta on korke-
ammalla, että talouspoliittinen epävarmuus on suurempaa, kun taloudellinen tilanne on heikompi 
ja, että osaketuotot liikkuvat yhtenäisemmin, kun taloustilanne on heikompi, jos yleistä talousti-
lannetta mitataan bruttokansantuotteen kasvulla. Nämä löydökset tukevat teoreettisia ennusteita, 
jotka Pástor ja Veronesi (2013) esittävät. 
Lisäksi tulokset näyttävät, että maan osakemarkkina liikkuu yhtenäisemmin toisten maiden 
markkinoiden kanssa sen jälkeen, kun se on liittynyt Euroopan Unioniin ja myös, kun se on otta-
nut käyttöön yhteisvaluutta euron. Havaittu vaikutus on suurempi, kun maa ottaa käyttöön euron. 
Tämä kertoo siitä, että yhteisellä valuutalla on suurempi vaikutus osakemarkkinoiden yhtenäisyy-
teen kuin yleisen tason taloudellisella yhtenäistymisellä. Tulokset osoittavat myös, että liittyminen 
Euroopan Unioniin ja euroalueeseen vaikuttaa maan sisäisten osaketuottojen yhtenäisyyteen, 
mutta tämän vaikutuksen suunta vaihtelee maiden välillä. Esitän, että tämä saattaa johtua maa-
kohtaisen poliittisen epävarmuuden tasosta ennen liittymistä Euroopan Unioniin ja siitä, että  
Euroopan Unionin tuoma muutos talous- ja rahoitusjärjestelmien kehityksen tasoon riippuu maan 
lähtötasosta. 
Tutkimuksen löydökset osoittavat, että talouspoliittinen epävarmuus ja Euroopan yhtenäisty-
minen saattavat vaikuttaa sijoittajien hajautuskykyyn, markkinoiden tehokkuuteen ja yhtiöiden 
hallinnointikoodin (engl. corporate governance) tehokkuuteen. 
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1 Introduction 
While the research on uncertainty and economic behavior dates back to the early days of modern 
economics (e.g. Keynes, 1936), the ability of contemporary technology to build accurate and 
continuous measures of uncertainty, and the recent series of economic and financial crises have 
brought up an upsurge of research focusing on the economic impact of uncertainty, particularly 
economic policy uncertainty. Economic policy uncertainty is the uncertainty about the economic 
policies that the government will choose in the future. Not only do government policy choices have 
clear direct effects on the operating environment of the private sector, such as through taxation, but 
also an indirect influence through factors such as the general macroeconomic conditions and changes 
in the demand provided by other agents who are affected by the policy choices. Intuitively, the 
uncertainty originating from government actions is largely non-diversifiable due to the pervasiveness 
of regulation and the sheer number of possible avenues through which policy choices affect firms. 
The beginning of the millennium has shown multiple major economic and political shocks, including, 
but not limited to, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
leading to the Great Recession of 2008-2012, and most recently the European sovereign debt crisis 
starting in 2009, also referred to as the Eurozone debt crisis. The latest has demonstrated how the 
decisions of governments in relatively small countries, such as Greece, can have extensive 
consequences in some of the largest economies in the world, including overall stock market jumps of 
several percent in economies such as the U.S., France, and Germany around decision announcements 
(Pástor and Veronesi, 2013). Uncertainty seems to intensely rise during such events, as measured by 
multiple proxies, such as stock market volatility, the cross-sectional spread of firm- and industry-
level earnings, and productivity growth (e.g. Bloom, 2009). While the likes of Bloom (2009) mostly 
consider relatively short economic and political shocks and the uncertainty spikes around them, the 
recent developments have shown that the global economic and financial system is also vulnerable to 
sustained multi-year crises that are susceptible to holding the level of uncertainty high for extended 
periods of time. 
The effects of uncertainty on the economy are intuitively not clear. On the one hand, it may be 
intuitive to think that uncertainty can depress economic activity. The more certain the information at 
hand is, the easier it should be to make deterministic decisions. Uncertainty may lead to a wait-and-
see attitude, given the value in the real option to delay and possibly expand or abandon the opportunity 
in question. On the other hand, uncertainty may actually have an increasing effect in economic 
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activity, particularly corporate investment. Consider an example of Hassett and Sullivan (2012): A 
firm that starts selling goods at price P0 is affected by the introduction of a random tax which causes 
the price to change between a lower price P1 and an equally higher price P2. Given an upward-sloping 
supply curve, the gain at the good state P2 would exceed the loss in the bad state P1. Now, assuming 
that the quantity of goods produced can be increased, uncertainty can increase profits and thus 
investment. Early literature examining the relationship of uncertainty and investment has found 
support for the latter (e.g. Hartman, 1972 and Abel, 1983). However, as Hassett and Sullivan (2012) 
note, a crucial assumption in the example is that adjustment is costless, whereas in reality, adjustment 
is virtually always costly, and investments are most of the time irreversible: custom purpose-built 
equipment is unlikely to have value to other firms, especially in bad economic conditions when the 
reversibility of the investment would be most needed. Academics have later incorporated the 
irreversibility and adjustment costs into the theories, most notably Bernanke (1983) and Rodrik 
(1991). Empirical support has been presented for this logic as well (e.g. Pindyck, 1988). 
Research on the asset pricing implications of policy uncertainty has focused on an election-based 
approach. Political elections provide a stable and normally highly exogenous dataset of events that 
first induce political uncertainty as the familiar incumbent government has to step down, and then 
resolve uncertainty as the election results reveal information about the future government and their 
likely policies. Empirical research has shown that national equity markets tend to show abnormal 
returns around elections, and that elections generate higher market volatility (e.g. Pantzalis et al., 
2000 and Bialkowski et al., 2008). The results are in line with the well-known Uncertain Information 
Hypothesis of Brown et al. (1988) who predict that risk and expected returns increase when 
uncertainty increases. However, using elections as a proxy for uncertainty may incur several 
problems. Most importantly, by construction, elections can only be used to measure assumed 
variation at the time of the election, leaving the variation of policy uncertainty uncaptured for the 
lengthy periods between elections (Gulen and Ion, 2015). In the European countries and the U.S., this 
means that an observation only occurs every 4 or 5 years, excluding prematurely called elections. 
Second, the election dataset is not able to quantify the level of uncertainty or the resolution of 
uncertainty, but rather relies on the assumption that an election resolves political uncertainty. As 
Brogaard and Detzel (2015) point out, there is no strong mechanism binding the decision-making of 
the elected politicians to their pre-election statements. Furthermore, the political decision-making 
process will nearly always require compromises and negotiation, making certain forecasts based on 
ideology and statements a virtual impossibility. 
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To form a better, continuous measure of policy uncertainty, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) develop 
a novel index of economic policy uncertainty based on newspaper coverage frequency of key policy-
relevant terms. A number of studies have utilized the new index in empirical and theoretical work. 
Gulen and Ion (2013) find that policy uncertainty can explain up to a third of the drop in investment 
during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Brogaard and Detzel (2015) construct a very similar index 
and show that increases in policy uncertainty are associated with lower contemporaneous market 
returns and higher market volatility. Pástor and Veronesi (2013) use the index to test their theory of 
the relation between policy uncertainty and equity risk premia. 
While proper measures of economic policy uncertainty have only been available for a relatively short 
time, the same applies to theoretical guidance on the relationship between political news and the 
financial markets. Pástor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) aim to fill the gap by providing equilibrium 
models on the asset pricing implications of political uncertainty. They interpret policy changes as 
“government actions that change the economic environment”. I follow the same interpretation in this 
paper. Pástor and Veronesi consider two kinds uncertainty: political uncertainty which they relate to 
uncertainty about whether the current government policy will change, and impact uncertainty which 
is uncertainty about the impact a new policy will have on the profitability of the private sector. In 
their first paper, Pástor and Veronesi (2012) construct a model where firm profitability follows a 
stochastic process whose mean is influenced by the current government policy, and where 
government decision-making follows both economic and non-economic motives. They show that it 
is optimal for the government to change policy when the current policy’s impact on firm profitability 
is seen as sufficiently negative. This leads to a situation where policy changes are expected after 
unexpectedly low realized profitability, or downturns. Following the model, they find two separate 
effects on stock prices: First, a policy change pushes stock prices up due to increasing firm 
profitability following the government’s decision rules. Second, since a policy change reverts the 
gains from learning about the old policy, a policy change increases discount rates. Intuitively, 
information about the old policy essentially becomes worthless since the old policy is no longer 
active. They find that this discount rate effect is stronger than the profitability effect, unless the old 
policy was very poor. Then, on average, stock prices react negatively to a policy change. Furthermore, 
they show that since the impact of new policies is less known, policy changes increase the volatility 
of the discount factor, and thus risk premia go up, and stocks become more volatile and more highly 
correlated. 
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In their second paper, Pástor and Veronesi (2013) develop a very similar but more advanced model 
of government policy choice. While their first study focuses on the stock market announcement 
reactions of policy changes, the second paper examines how prices respond to signals about possible 
future policy decisions, or the general level of policy uncertainty. They add two new features to the 
model: learning about political costs of new policies, and policy heterogeneity. They show that the 
government is more likely to adopt a policy with a lower political cost and if the policy’s impact on 
firm profitability is perceived as higher or less uncertain. This resembles the traditional mean-
variance optimizing investor. As a result, policy change is more likely in worse economic conditions 
where the current policy is considered as adverse. Pástor and Veronesi label this effect as government-
provided “put protection” which effectively protects the market from bad times by replacing poor 
policies. Continuing, they show asset pricing implications that arise when investors learn about the 
impact of potential policies on firm profitability and about the political costs of potential policies. 
Quoting Pástor and Veronesi (2013): “For instance, -- the Greek prime minister’s announcement of 
his wish to hold a referendum must have led investors to update their beliefs about the probability at 
Greece will decide to leave the Eurozone in the future”. Their model shows that political uncertainty 
commands a risk premium that is larger in worse economic conditions. Pástor and Veronesi 
analytically find that policy uncertainty pushes up the equity risk premium and the volatilities and 
correlations of stocks. Using the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2015) and stock 
price data for the S&P500 index constituents, they conduct a brief empirical check, finding supportive 
evidence for the implications of their model. Pástor and Veronesi’s (2013) theory is described in more 
detail in section 2. 
Through the predictions on individual stock return correlations, Pástor and Veronesi’s (2012, 2013) 
models introduced above suggest that higher economic policy uncertainty should drive synchronicity 
up. Synchronicity is the degree to which individual stock prices move up and down together (Li et 
al., 2003). Intuitively, a higher synchronicity indicates that the prices are driven to a higher degree by 
aggregate components, as opposed to firm-specific factors. Changes in stock return synchronicity can 
have multiple important implications on the economy and financial markets, mostly derived from the 
influential notion of Roll (1988) that the relative amounts of market-level and firm-level information 
capitalized into prices are the most important determinants of stock market co-movement, or 
synchronicity. 
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First, Campbell et al. (2001) remark that the diversification achieved by a certain number of stocks 
depends on the level of idiosyncratic volatility in the stock that make up the portfolio. The more firm-
specific variation, the more stocks are required to fully diversify. Since a large part of investors are 
arguably not fully diversified, a greater firm-specific variation in returns, or lower synchronicity, 
leaves the non-diversified investors exposed to greater risk. Second, higher synchronicity may be 
indicative of market inefficiency. Roll (1988) finds that firm-specific price movements reflect trading 
by those with private information. Following the same logic, Morck et al. (2000) imply that lower 
synchronicity, or higher firm-specific variation, may be indicative of more active arbitrage. Third, 
synchronicity may have corporate governance implications. Morck et al. (1988) find that corporate 
governance actions such top management turnover or investor pressure are associated with firm 
performance relative to the industry. In other words, poor performance alongside the whole industry 
is viewed as understandable, not leading to actions. Based on their earlier work, Li et al. (2003) argue 
that corporate governance mechanisms in general are more effective when an individual firm’s 
performance is more easily differentiated from its industry. 
While stock market synchronicity has been conceptually examined since French and Roll (1986) and 
Roll (1988), and despite the multitude of implications, a relatively limited amount of empirical 
research has been presented, mainly focusing on the role of market maturity. Roll (1988) first shows 
that only a small part of the price movements of individual stocks can be explained by broad economic 
influences and industry influences. Campbell et al. (2001) show that, in the U.S., synchronicity has 
shown a stable decline during the period from 1962 to 1997. Li et al. (2003) also show a similar, 
although weaker, trend internationally. They attribute the trend mostly to developments in the 
openness of capital markets and institutional integrity. In addition, Morck et al. (2000) show that 
stock prices move together more in emerging markets than in rich economies, attributing the 
differences among countries mainly to weaker or stronger property rights. They argue that “strong 
property rights promote informed arbitrage, which capitalizes detailed firm-specific information”. 
Others have since repeated the examination between emerging and developed markets (e.g. Fernandes 
and Ferreira, 2008; Khandaker and Heaney, 2009), showing consistent results. Finally, Gul et al. 
(2010) relate synchronicity to ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, and audit quality. They 
find that synchronicity is concavely related to largest shareholder ownership, and further show higher 
synchronicity when the largest shareholder is government-related. 
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The growing integration of the world economy adds a further dimension. The European economy and 
financial markets are becoming increasingly integrated and developed, which has been one of the 
large goals of the Union since its inception. As the EU sets in place mechanisms to direct the European 
economy, political power is transferred from the individual nations to the Union. An example of this 
is the introduction of a common currency, the euro. Countries that decide to adopt the euro surrender 
control over monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB), thus making the economy of the 
country more dependent on the common European economic policy. While more developed countries 
have been found to show lower levels of synchronicity, the increasing economic integration between 
countries should intuitively make stock markets more united as well, leading to higher synchronicity 
between the countries. Clearly, when administrative measures are implemented to connect the 
governments and economies of countries, the influence of factors outside an individual country 
should grow. Since these outside factors likely affect all stocks in the country to some degree, we see 
a growing impact of common influences, further leading to a higher degree of co-movement. Now, 
as the evolution of the European Union aims to both develop the markets and make them more united, 
there may be multiple contemporaneous, opposite effects. Furthermore, when some of the power of 
the internal politics of the country is transferred to the EU, if EU policy is more stable than country 
policy, synchronicity may actually decline inside the country. Therefore, while synchronicity between 
the countries can be expected to increase with the level of integration, the effect inside the individual 
countries may actually vary based on factors such as the variability or instability of the internal 
country politics. This dynamic is further discussed in section 2. 
1.1 Research questions 
In this paper, I examine the relationship of economic policy uncertainty and stock return 
synchronicity in the European Union (EU), both inside the member countries and inside the Union. I 
aim to provide answers to  
1) whether the time-varying economic policy uncertainty has an effect on stock return 
synchronicity, 
2) whether this effect is state-dependent on the economic conditions, 
3) and whether stock return synchronicity is influenced by the increasing European integration. 
Given Pástor and Veronesi’s (2012, 2013) theoretical work, policy uncertainty is generally expected 
to drive synchronicity up, especially in weaker economic conditions. In addition, I investigate the 
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effects of both a country joining the EU, as well as the Eurozone. To proxy for policy uncertainty, I 
employ the widely adopted European policy uncertainty indices of Baker et al. (2015). To measure 
stock market synchronicity, I use the !" statistic from a market model regression, following French 
and Roll (1986), Roll (1988), and the earlier literature on synchronicity. 
1.2 Contribution to the literature 
My thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: 
1) I provide the first empirical evidence on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty 
and stock return synchronicity, using the widely accepted R-squared based measure to proxy 
for synchronicity. 
2) I examine and provide the first empirical evidence on the effects of the increasing integration 
of the European economy on stock market integration by studying stock return synchronicity 
intra-country and inter-country inside the European Union. 
1.3 Limitations of the study 
Individual economic policy uncertainty indices are available for six of the European Union member 
states, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 
addition, a common European index is available. All of these do not completely cover the full sample 
period. Most notably, the indices for the Netherlands and Spain are only available since 2001 and 
2003, respectively. However, I argue that the common European policy uncertainty index is a suitable 
proxy for policy uncertainty in the EU member states in the context of my study, since my focus is 
especially on the growing political and economic integration of the European Union. This is also 
supported by the fact that the indices seem to move together, in general. The mean correlation 
between the individual indices during the period when all indices are available is approximately 0,65. 
However, the smaller number of observations for some indices may lead to lower statistical power in 
the results. This is visible when the signs of the regressions for the countries are generally very 
similar, but some of the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
The same limitation applies to the availability of value-weighted stock market indices for some of the 
countries. While such indices are generally available for many decades for the larger stock markets, 
many of the smaller countries have shorter availability of such indices. However, to mitigate this 
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limitation, I repeat all tests for both an equally weighted measure of stock return synchronicity 
calculated directly from the individual stock returns, as well as for the value-weighted indices 
available. 
1.4 Main findings 
In support of Pástor and Veronesi (2013), I find that both intra-country and inter-country stock return 
synchronicity increase with economic policy uncertainty, that policy uncertainty is generally higher 
in weaker economic conditions, and that stock return synchronicity generally increases when 
economic conditions decline, when measured with GDP growth. However, the empirical evidence 
shows only weak support for the hypothesis that the influence of policy uncertainty is higher in 
weaker economic conditions. Rather, the relationship seems linear in the sample. 
Next, I hypothesize that stock return synchronicity between the European countries is expected to 
increase with the level of political and economic integration, as the countries are affected to a higher 
degree by new common factors, such as the regulation by the EU institutions and the introduction of 
the euro as a shared currency. Intuitively, since the exposure to factors such as regulation cannot be 
fully diversified, the importance of common systematic factors grows, and thus synchronicity is 
expected to be higher. In support of the hypothesis, I find that both joining the European Union and 
joining the euro area increase stock return synchronicity between countries. Interestingly, I also find 
that the inter-country effect of joining the euro area is stronger than that of joining the EU: currency 
integration seems to be more important in the financial markets than general economic and political 
integration. 
The influence of the growing integration is less clear inside the countries. On the one hand, the 
common European policy has a stronger effect on all stocks, leading to higher co-movement. On the 
other hand, the common European policy may be more stable than the country policy, leading to 
decreased systematic variation. Furthermore, joining the EU and the euro area may significantly 
develop the markets in some countries, leading to lower synchronicity, as implied by the earlier 
literature on emerging markets. The magnitude of the different contemporaneous effects depends on 
multiple qualities of the country at the time of joining the EU or the euro area. Therefore, I expect 
that the European integration also has an effect on stock return synchronicity inside the countries, but 
I expect the direction of the effect to depend on the country. The empirical evidence supports this 
view: in approximately half of the countries synchronicity increases and in the other half declines 
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when joining the EU or the euro area. Moreover, the direction of the effects of joining the EU and 
adopting the euro is not always consistent for a country. This is natural, since the two events are on 
average separated by approximately six years, and thus the underlying qualities of the country can be 
significantly different at the two points of time. As opposed to the inter-country examination, the 
evidence does not provide support for a difference in the relative strength of the two effects inside 
the countries. 
Finally, I find that the influence of the common European policy uncertainty on stock return 
synchronicity does not depend on the level of integration, but remains approximately the same after 
joining the EU or the euro area. 
1.5 Structure 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background 
and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the study. 
2 Theoretical background and and hypothesis development 
2.1 The stock pricing implications of policy uncertainty 
The following reviews the main construction of the general equilibrium model relating political 
uncertainty and stock prices, as presented in Pástor and Veronesi (2013)1. 
Suppose an economy with a finite time horizon [0, &], with a continuum of firms ( ∈ [0, 1] The firms 
are fully financed by equity. Let +,- be the capital of firm ( at time .. At . = 0, the capital of all firms 
is +0- = 1. Now, assume that the capital is invested with a stochastic rate of return 1Π,- , and proceeds 
are reinvested. Then, the capital of firm ( follows 1B,- = +,-1Π,- . As all firms are financed by equity, 
                                                
1 I aim to provide an overview on the mathematical construction and the intuition behind the model. 
For an exhaustive analytical derivation of all propositions, refer to the papers of Pástor and Veronesi 
(2012, 2013). 
(1) 
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profits are over the book value of equity, +,-, and thus Pástor and Veronesi refer to 1Π,-  as the 
profitability of firm (. The profitability follows the process 
1Π,- = 4 + 6, 1. + 718, + 7918,-  
for . ∈ [0, &]. 4, 7 and 79 are constants, 8, is a Brownian motion, 8,- is a firm-specific Brownian 
motion, and 6, represents the current government policy’s effect on the profitability of firms. For a 
policy that has no impact on firm profitability, 6, = 0. 
Next, at time :, 0 < : < &, a policy decision is made either to adopt one of < new policies or to keep 
the current policy. Then, the policy’s impact on profitability, 6,, is 
6, = 60				>?@	. ≤ :																																																											60				>?@	. > :					(>	.ℎD	?E1	F?E(GH	(I	Gℎ?IDJ		6K				>?@	. > :					(>	L	JDM	F?E(GH	J	(I	Gℎ?IDJ	 
Crucially, 6, is unknown for all . ∈ [0, &], as the impact that policies have on profitability is uncertain 
for both the government that is making the policy decision as well as the investors owning the firms. 
The prior impacts are normally distributed. 
Now, investors maximize expected utility based on terminal wealth:  
N OPQ = OPQ 9RS1 − U  
for each investor V ∈ [0,1]. O,Q is the wealth for investor V at time &, and U is the relative risk aversion. 
The government maximizes a similar power utility function, with one key difference: the government 
also considers the political cost, or benefit, of choosing a policy. Let us denote the political cost of 
choosing policy J ∈ {0,…	, <} by ZK. Then, the government’s policy decision maximizes 
[\ ZKOP9RS1 − U 	|	F?E(GH	J 	, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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where OP is the final aggregate capital. ZK is greater than 1 when there is a political cost, and less 
than 1 when there is a political benefit for the government to choose policy n. When the old policy is 
retained, there is no political cost or benefit, and ZK = 1. The prior ZK K^9_  are log-normally 
distributed. Importantly, the source of political uncertainty in the model is the uncertainty about ZK K^9_ . Both analytically and intuitively, when the political cost related to each of the potential 
policies is more uncertain, it is more difficult to predict which policy will get chosen.  
The political cost component also captures factors that can lead the government to deviate from 
strictly maximizing investor welfare, such as the distribution of wealth, corruption, or special interest 
groups, all discussed in the political economy literature2. Given these disturbances, analytically the 
log-normal nature of the political cost, Pástor and Veronesi note that the government in the model is 
quasi-benevolent, maximizing investor wealth on average but not always. They also point out that 
while this allows for capturing uncertainty in the model, it does not necessarily imply that the 
government has misguided motives, but rather acknowledges the complexity of the political 
environment. 
Next, let us introduce the effect of learning new information in the model. First, consider the impact 
of all possible policies J ∈ {0,…	, <} on firm profitability. For all policies, including the current one, 
the policy impact is unknown to both the investors and the government. From time 0 to :, they observe 
the realized profitability of all firms, and learn about 60, the impact of the current policy. If the 
realized profitability differs from the expected profitability, an impact shock arises, and beliefs about 60 are revised: up when the realized profitability is higher, and down when the realized profitability 
is worse than expected. It is important to note that while the agents learn about the impact of the 
current policy, decreasing the uncertainty about 60 over time, no learning about the impact of any 
potential new policies happens. This is intuitive, since realized profitability cannot be observed for 
any other than the prevailing policy. Similarly, if there is a policy change at time :, the agents start 
learning about the new policy instead of the old one, and beliefs about the impact of the active policy 
are reset. 
                                                
2 Pástor and Veronesi refer to the textbook of Drazen (2000), and the papers of Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Grossmann and Helpman (1994), Coate and Morris (1995), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Rose-Ackerman (1999). 
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Second, consider the political costs associated with choosing a policy. As opposed to the policy 
impact on profitability, the political cost of the current policy, Z0, is known, since this is considered 
a one-time cost which has already incurred when the policy was chosen. In contrast, the political costs 
of all potential new policies J ∈ {1,…	, <} are unknown. The investors and the government learn 
about the political costs of potential new policies through political news, negotiations, and debates, 
among other political events. Pástor and Veronesi refer to these as political signals which lead to 
political shocks in the model. Note that while the agents can only learn about the profitability effect 
of the currently active policy, as discussed earlier, they can learn more about the political cost of any 
potential policy also before the policy decision. Furthermore, note that learning in general only 
decreases uncertainty and does not completely remove it. 
Given the framework described so far, Pástor and Veronesi derive from the utility function of the 
government (equation 4) that the government only chooses policy J if for all policies ` ≠ J,` ∈{0,…	, <}: 
4K − GK > 4b − Gb	, 
where 4 represents the impact on profitability and G represents the political cost. Now, since the 
political cost has already incurred for the old policy, as discussed earlier, G0 = 0. Therefore, the 
government will only change policy at time : if the old policy has a sufficiently low impact on average 
firm profitability. 
Next, let us review the relevant asset pricing implications. The model proposes that policy uncertainty 
affects stock prices through impact shocks and through political shocks. The shocks are induced by 
learning that generates stochastic variation in the beliefs about policy impacts and political costs. 
Intuitively, the effects are the following3. First, the impact shocks command an impact risk premium, 
                                                
3My intention is to provide an overview of the logic. Analytically, the beliefs at time . are represented 
by a set of stochastic state variables (6,, G,9, …	, G,_). Recall, that 6, is generally the profitability 
impact of the prevailing policy at time ., and G\K represents the political cost of policy J, should it be 
chosen at time :. This set has a direct effect on the diffusion process followed by the stochastic 
discount factor which in turn describes the movement of the state price density. Then, both impact 
shocks and political shocks will command a risk premium. For the full derivation, refer to sections 
4.1 to 4.3 of Pástor and Veronesi (2013). 
(5) 
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since investors require compensation for uncertainty about the impact of the current policy on firm 
profitability. Learning about the profitability impact will change future capital growth expectations 
and beliefs about how likely the government is to change policy. Second, the political shocks 
command a political risk premium, as investors require compensation for uncertainty about which 
new policy will be chosen in the future. 
Both of these are highly state-dependent. When the believed profitability impact of the prevailing 
policy goes down, it is increasingly likely that the current policy will be replaced with a new policy. 
This means that the profitability impact of the current policy will be temporary, and only relevant 
until the policy change. In contrast, when the believed profitability impact of the prevailing policy 
goes up, it is less and less likely that the current policy would be replaced, meaning that the impact 
of the current policy will be more permanent, thus making impact shocks more relevant. A similar 
logic applies to political shocks. When the probability of a policy change rises, uncertainty about the 
political costs of potential new policies becomes more important, making political shocks more 
relevant. Whereas when it is unlikely that the current policy will change, the potential new policies 
are less important. 
While the state-dependency is modeled in relation to 6,, the perceived policy impact on firm 
profitability, it would be easy to express the same state-dependency in terms of economic conditions 
as well. When economic conditions are strong, it is clearly unlikely that the prevailing policy is seen 
as a bad policy. Whereas when economic conditions are weak, the current policy is unlikely seen as 
a very good policy. 
Pástor and Veronesi show that given a set of policies that yield the same utility based on the impact 
in profitability, the policies with higher political uncertainty will draw lower announcement returns. 
Since the uncertainty is not firm-specific, it pushes up discount rates and thus depresses asset prices. 
However, it must be noted that theoretically a higher announcement return does not necessarily 
maximize the utility on which the policy decision is based on. A policy can be welfare-improving 
even if it has a higher uncertainty about its profitability impact. Prices and welfare coincide only 
when the policies in question are equally risky. However, in this paper I focus on investigating the 
degree of co-movement of stock prices and not the level of prices as such. 
 18 
Finally, the model implies that individual stocks will be more correlated with each other when 
political uncertainty is higher. Since all firms are considered equally exposed to the policy choices of 
the government, changes in the risk premium components affect all firms similarly. As the risk 
premium components discussed above are common to all stocks, when the influence of a component 
grows relatively larger, the degree to which all stocks are affected by the same factor increases. Then, 
we should see the stocks get more correlated with each other. Pástor and Veronesi find that the 
political risk premium is the largest component of the total risk premium when political uncertainty 
is high. Changes in the political risk premium are induced by political shocks which, again, affect all 
firms. While the assumption that all firms are equally affected by government actions is not 
necessarily true in reality, it is intuitive that most firms are generally affected by government 
decisions, even if that may be to a varying degree. The following introduces my hypotheses based on 
the theory presented above. 
According to the theory of Pástor and Veronesi (2013), in good economic conditions, the government 
is likely to retain its current policy. Thus, the level of political uncertainty is low. In contrast, when 
the economic conditions are worse, the government is expected to act and policy change is more 
likely. When policy change is more likely, the relevance of the uncertainty about which policy will 
be chosen is higher. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
H1:  Economic policy uncertainty is higher when economic conditions are worse. 
Next, relying on the first hypothesis, when political uncertainty is higher, the political component of 
the equity risk premium affecting all firms is also higher. Since this political risk premium cannot be 
fully diversified, stock returns are to a greater extent affected by a common component, and it follows 
that: 
H2: The intra-country and inter-country stock return synchronicity is higher when policy 
uncertainty is higher. 
It also immediately follows from H1 and H2 that: 
H3: The intra-country and inter-country stock return synchronicity is higher when economic 
conditions are worse. 
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Next, according to the model of Pástor and Veronesi, political shocks have a state-dependent effect 
on stock prices. In addition to the sign of these shocks being as discussed above, they should matter 
the most when economic conditions are weak, and vice versa. Therefore: 
H4: Policy uncertainty has a stronger effect on stock return synchronicity when economic 
conditions are worse. 
2.2 The European economic integration and stock return synchronicity 
The European economy is becoming increasingly united through administrative channels designed 
and executed by common European governing bodies. The key institutions include the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and the European 
Commission4. The European Parliament represents the European citizens through elected members. 
The European Council includes the heads of state of the member states. Similarly, the Council of the 
European Union consists of one national minister from each member state. However, which national 
minister attends each time they meet is dependent on the topic at hand. For example, when financial 
topics are discussed, the ministers of finance attend. Finally, the European Commission is formed by 
one Commissioner from each country. The Commission is considered politically independent. It 
drafts and proposes all law of the European Union, holding monopoly over legislative initiative. 
Following a proposal from the Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament together adopt the wording of the act, and potentially approve the act. The Commission 
then implements the approved legislation. This forms the ordinary legislative procedure of the 
European Union5. 
The legislative procedure leads to a number of legal measures guiding or mandating the legislation 
of the individual member countries. Some of the measures include regulations, directives, decisions, 
recommendations, and opinions. Some are binding acts, while others are merely guidelines. In May 
                                                
4 In addition to the four mentioned institutions, there are over a dozen other institutions with 
considerable economic or political power. A full introduction to all of the institutions can be found at 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm (accessed on May 10th, 2016).  
5 A more in-depth description of the legislative process of the European Union can be found at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers 
(accessed on May 10th, 2016). 
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2016, the total number of different types or legislation in force was over 32 thousand acts6. When a 
country joins the Union, it comes under the force of this legislation, immediately integrating it to the 
Union. Clearly, some of the implementation of the integration happens over time, but at this point it 
is clear to the investors that the whole legislation must be adopted, and thus this information should 
be incorporated in to asset prices as well. 
All member states of the EU are part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The purpose of 
the EMU is to coordinate and converge the economic, fiscal, and monetary policies of the member 
states. Importantly, the EMU is not an institution, but rather an implementation plan to achieve the 
aforementioned purpose. The responsibility of the implementation of the convergence is divided to 
seven EU institutions, including all four mentioned above, and the European Central Bank. The EMU 
is a three-stage plan, and all member states follow the stages at their own, but closely monitored, 
pace. 
The final stage of the EMU is adopting a single currency inside the EU, the euro. All countries joining 
the EU agree to eventually adopt the euro, unless explicitly granted an opt-out. Currently, only 
Denmark and the United Kingdom have such an opt-out. Interestingly, and often overlooked, this 
means that countries that are part of the EU but that have not yet adopted the euro, such as Sweden, 
are eventually obliged to adopt the common currency.   
The Eurosystem is formed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks of the member 
states in the euro area. The ECB has two main roles: it manages the euro and conducts the economic 
and monetary policy of the EU. The primary objective of the the ECB is to keep prices stable to 
support economic growth and job creation7. The role of the member state central banks is to 
implement the policy defined by the ECB. There are multiple ways through which the ECB can 
influence the economy and the financial markets. Most importantly, it has direct control over the main 
interest rates on its lending to commercial banks, controlling the supply of money and inflation. These 
include the rates on the main refinancing operations providing liquidity to the banking system, the 
                                                
6 Based on the public records available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ (accessed on May 7th, 2016). 
(Advanced search with options: Domain: EU law and related documents, Subdomain: Legislation, 
Limit to legislation in force, Exclude corrigenda.) 
7 According to the overview of the European Central Bank provided by the EU, available at 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/ecb/index_en.htm (accessed on May 11th, 2016). 
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deposit facility for overnight deposits from the banks, and the marginal lending facility for overnight 
credit to the banks. These rates have a fundamental influence on the financial markets, exposing all 
assets to the policy decisions of the ECB. 
Joining the EU and later the euro area define two distinct points in time when a considerable 
“integration shock” happens between the new member and the EU. While joining the EU exposes the 
new member state to the bulk of legislation discussed earlier, adopting the euro has a similar effect 
through the Eurosystem. Note that generally there is a significant period of time between the two 
shocks, allowing for investigating them separately. The exact joining dates are presented in table 1 in 
section 3. 
Given the economic and financial significance of both events, the stock returns should be affected. 
After the integration shock, all stocks in the country are more affected by the same factors as in the 
other member countries, including economic and political elements such as regulation by common 
institutions. The degree to which the individual stocks are affected is likely to vary according to the 
exposure to, for instance, foreign trade. However, some factors, such as the exposure to the common 
European financial regulation, can never be fully diversified. Now, as the stock markets in the 
different countries are affected by the same factors to a greater degree, it follows that: 
H5: Inter-country stock return synchronicity is higher after the country joins the European Union 
and the euro area. 
The effect inside the country is less clear. On the one hand, new common factors, such as the 
European regulation that the country adopts, affect all stocks to some degree. This would increase the 
relative importance of systematic factors, leading to higher synchronicity. On the other hand, if the 
variation in these new systematic factors is significantly lower than in the old elements, the total 
systematic variation would decrease, and we should thus expect lower synchronicity. Intuitively, if 
joining the EU decreases the relative importance of the country policy uncertainty compared to the 
European policy uncertainty, and if the European policy is generally more stable than the country 
policy, we should see lower synchronicity. Given that stability is one of the most important goals of 
the EU, this is likely relevant in countries where political instability is generally higher. Note, 
however, that synchronicity does not consider the level of the variation as such, but merely the relative 
levels of systematic and idiosyncratic variation. Thus, even when the relative influence of systematic 
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factors grows compared to firm-specific factors, synchronicity may be lower if the variation in the 
systematic factors decreases. Given the multiple contemporaneous effects, the intra-country 
hypothesis is less resolute:  
H6: Joining the EU and the euro area have an effect on intra-country synchronicity, but the 
direction of the effect depends on the country. 
Recall that all new member states must agree not only to accept the full weight of the EU legislation 
but also to eventually adopt the euro, barring an explicitly negotiated and granted opt-out. 
Specifically, they commit to joining the euro area as soon as they have set in place the obligatory 
national laws and meet the economic requirements known as the “convergence criteria”. The criteria 
contain conditions on, for instance, price stability, exchange rate stability, and public finance, 
including strict limits on government deficit and debt levels.8 
Now, since the decision to eventually adopt the common currency must be made contemporaneously 
with the decision to join the EU, the uncertainty about the currency decision will no longer be about 
whether it will happen, but rather about when it will happen. From the perspective of the traditional 
financial theory, this means that part of the information related to the currency decision is released to 
the market already at this point. It follows that part of the asset pricing shock related to adopting the 
euro should be seen already together with the shock related to joining the EU. 
However, the convergence criteria are highly demanding. This is clearly illustrated by the time 
periods it took the current euro area countries to meet the conditions. For the countries that have 
joined the EU after the inception of euro in 1999, the average period between joining the EU and 
adopting the euro has been 2175 days, or 15 days short of 6 years. The shortest period a country has 
been able to meet the criteria in has been 975 days, or 3.7 years, for Slovenia. Due to the length of 
the time period between them, these are clearly two separate events. 
                                                
8 A full overview of the requirements and the specific numeric criteria are available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm (accessed on May 
11th, 2016). 
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Then, given any uncertainty at all about how long it will take for the new member state to comply to 
the requirements, only some part of the information related to the decision to join the euro area can 
be incorporated into prices at the moment of joining the EU. Considering that it is virtually impossible 
to perfectly accurately forecast any economic or financial developments across several years, there 
must be some uncertainty. Therefore, I argue that separately both joining the EU and joining the euro 
area should induce a significant integration shock, leading to significant asset pricing implications. 
However, as it is also clear that the two decisions are conceptually made at the same time, as discussed 
earlier, I also argue that a part of the total shock induced by joining the euro area should coincide 
with the moment of joining the EU. It follows: 
H7: Both joining the EU and joining the euro area have a significant effect on stock return 
synchronicity, but the effect observed when joining the EU is stronger. 
Finally, since the political systems of the EU member states are tightly joined, it is intuitively 
expected that the influence of the general European policy uncertainty should be higher on the country 
after joining the EU. The same intuition applies to joining the euro area, especially due to surrendering 
monetary policy to the ECB. Therefore: 
H8: The common European policy uncertainty has a stronger effect on stock return synchronicity 
after the country has joined the EU and after the country has joined the euro area. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
I examine stock market synchronicity in the European Union using data from 27 EU member 
countries9. The sample covers a period of 26 years from January 1990 to December 2015. In the 
beginning of the period, 12 of the 27 countries were EU members, while the other 15 have joined at 
                                                
9 There are currently 28 member countries in the European Union, but I exclude Romania from the 
sample due to data availability and quality. 
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some point during the period. At the end of the period, 19 of the 27 countries had joined the euro 
area. Table 1 summarizes the joining dates of the countries. 
I use daily stock price data for all available stocks during the sample period, including the dead stocks 
that have been active at some point during the period. The stock price data are total return indices 
provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream. In addition, I use daily value-weighted country-level 
indices for the stock markets of the 27 countries, also obtained through Datastream. Equally weighted 
indices are calculated directly from the individual stock prices to best match the country-level indices 
to the sample of stocks. The sample covers a total of 6 784 trading days in 312 months, and a total of 
26 893 stocks that have been traded at some point during the period. 
As a proxy of policy uncertainty, I use the recent economic policy uncertainty index by Baker et al. 
(2015)10. The index is based on newspaper articles, specifically the frequency of articles containing 
policy-relevant terms, and is validated by human audits of several thousand articles. Individual 
monthly policy uncertainty indices are available for 6 EU member countries, including France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In addition, I utilize the common 
European index for the remainder of the countries. Figure 1 plots the monthly time series for all of 
the mentioned policy uncertainty indices. As can be seen, the availability of all individual indices 
does not fully cover the total sample period. However, all tests are repeated separately for both the 
European index as well as the country indices. Table 2 summarizes the policy uncertainty index data. 
I use three different measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). Quarterly GDP data is provided by the 
OECD Statistics for all countries11. The monthly ESI and BCI are collected and provided by the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), under the European 
Commission12. Figure 2 plots the European policy certainty index and GDP growth. For convenience, 
the index in the plot is scaled to the same mean and standard deviation as the GDP growth. Figure 3 
plots the GDP growth and the scaled ESI, and figure 4 plots the GDP growth and the scaled BCI. 
                                                
10 The index is publicly available at http://www.policyuncertainty.com (accessed on May 10th, 2016).  
11 The data is publicly available at http://stats.oecd.org (accessed on May 10th, 2016). I use a standard 
cubic spline interpolation to turn the quarterly GDP time series into a monthly series for all countries. 
12 The data is publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance (accessed on May 10th, 
2016). 
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Table 1 
The dates of joining the European Union and the euro area 
 
This table reports the dates when the 27 sample countries have joined the European Union and the euro area, 
if applicable. In addition, the period between the two dates is reported. 
 
 
  Joined the EU on Joined the euro area on Difference 
      Days Years 
Austria 1-Jan-1995 1-Jan-1999 1461 4,0 
Belgium 1-Jan-1958 1-Jan-1999 14 975 41,0 
Bulgaria 1-Jan-2007 - - - 
Croatia 1-Jan-2013 - - - 
Cyprus 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2008 1340 3,7 
Czech 1-May-2004 - - - 
Denmark 1-Jan-1973 - - - 
Estonia 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2011 2 436 6,7 
Finland 1-Jan-1995 1-Jan-1999 1 461 4,0 
France 1-Jan-1958 1-Jan-1999 14 975 41,0 
Germany 1-Jan-1958 1-Jan-1999 14 975 41,0 
Greece 1-Jan-1981 1-Jan-2001 7 305 20,0 
Hungary 1-May-2004 - - - 
Ireland 1-Jan-1973 1-Jan-1999 9 496 26,0 
Italy 1-Jan-1958 1-Jan-1999 14 975 41,0 
Latvia 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2014 3 532 9,7 
Lithuania 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2015 3 897 10,7 
Luxembourg 1-Jan-1958 1-Jan-1999 14 975 41,0 
Malta 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2008 1 340 3,7 
Netherlands 1-Jan-1958 1-Jan-1999 14 975 41,0 
Poland 1-May-2004 - - - 
Portugal 1-Jan-1986 1-Jan-1999 4 748 13,0 
Slovakia 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2009 1 706 4,7 
Slovenia 1-May-2004 1-Jan-2007 975 2,7 
Spain 1-Jan-1986 1-Jan-1999 4 748 13,0 
Sweden 1-Jan-1995 - - - 
UK 1-Jan-1973 - -   - 
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Figure 1. The policy uncertainty indices. 
This figure plots the monthly time series for the sample of seven economic policy uncertainty indices 
by Baker et al. (2015). 
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Table 2  
Summary of the policy uncertainty index data 
 
This table summarizes the economic policy uncertainty indices by Baker et al. (2015). The index is based on 
newspaper mention frequency of policy-related terminology. An index is available for the common European 
level of policy uncertainty, as well as for six European Union member states individually. 
 
  Mean Median St. dev. Index begins on 
France 129,10 110,56 76,60 1-Jan-1990 
Germany 113,03 103,94 51,86 1-Jan-1993 
Italy 108,76 104,04 38,65 1-Jan-1997 
Netherlands 98,29 83,47 50,46 1-Mar-2003 
Spain 107,01 97,62 56,62 1-Jan-2001 
United Kingdom 133,76 111,51 83,84 1-Jan-1990 
Europe 119,49 106,60 47,56 1-Jan-1990 
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Figure 2. GDP growth and the European policy uncertainty index. 
This figure plots the European GDP growth (1 = 100%), and the European policy uncertainty index 
by Baker et al. (2015) scaled to the same mean and standard deviation. 
  
Figure 3. GDP growth and the Economic Sentiment Indicator. 
This figure plots the European GDP growth (1 = 100%), and the European Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI) scaled to the same mean and standard deviation. 
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Figure 4. GDP growth and the Business Climate Indicator. 
This figure plots the European GDP growth (1 = 100%), and the European Business Climate Indicator 
(BCI) scaled to the same mean and standard deviation. 
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3.2 Methodology 
To measure stock return synchronicity, I employ a market model regression for individual stocks in 
the sample countries. This methodology follows Roll (1988) and French and Roll (1986), and has 
become the standard approach to quantifying synchronicity in the literature (e.g. Morck et al., 2000; 
Li et al., 2003; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Gul et al., 2010). The market model is defined as 
@-,, = L- + d-	@b,, + D-,,	, 
where @-,, is the total return of each stock ( ∈ J on day . ∈ :, and @b,, is the respective market return. 
All returns used are logarithmic returns. To obtain a monthly time series, I run the regression for each 
country V ∈ e, for each month : ∈ &Q, where e includes the 27 countries in the sample, and &Q includes 
all months for which data is available for the country V. For robustness, I define @b,, in the regression 
in two different ways. First, I use a standard value-weighted market index for the country V. Second, 
I define @b,, as the equally weighted average return for all stocks J in the country ( excluding stock V: 
@b,, = eQ,,	×		@Q,, − @-,,eK,, − 1  
Intuitively, I exclude the stock itself since it will by definition be perfectly correlated with itself, 
potentially introducing upward bias. The less stocks in the country V during the period :, the more 
bias would be introduced. 
The !" statistic of the market model regression allows for distinguishing the the firm-specific 
movements from market-wide movements, or systematic factors (Roll, 1988). Then, the average !" 
for all stocks in a country describes the level of stock return synchronicity inside the country. Higher 
values of !" indicate higher synchronicity, as more of the variation in the return of the individual 
stock is explained by the return of the other stocks.  
Since the R2 statistic is by construction bounded within the interval [0, 1], I apply a logistic 
transformation to make it suitable for use as a dependent variable, a standard econometric practice 
(e.g. Morck et al., 2000). Then, the final measure of synchronicity is defined as: 
(6) 
(7) 
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gQ,\ = log !Q,\"1 − !Q,\" 	, 
where gQ,\ is the stock return synchronicity in country V for month :.  
In addition, I investigate the inter-country stock return synchronicity using country-level stock market 
indices. Then, the market model regression takes the form 
@Q,, = LQ + dQ	@klmnop,, + DQ,,	, 
where @Q,, is the stock market return for country V ∈ e on day . ∈ :, and @klmnop,, is the equally 
weighted average return of all other European country indices in the sample. The R2 value is then 
collected for each country V ∈ e, for each month : ∈ &Q, where e includes the 27 countries in the 
sample, and &Q includes all months for which data is available for the country V. Again, I repeat the 
tests using both value-weighted and equally weighted country-level indices. 
To examine the hypotheses, I introduce gQ,\ and the factors discussed in the hypotheses in section 2 
in standard ordinary least squares regressions. However, since gQ,\ shows a significant amount of 
autocorrelation, I also introduce the lagged gQ,\ as an independent variable, which soaks up nearly all 
of the serial correlation. The same applies to the economic policy uncertainty index by Baker at al. 
(2015). Furthermore, as an additional measure against autocorrelation, all significance statistics 
presented are calculated using Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  
In addition, since each regression is run for each country, a distribution of signs is observed for each 
coefficient estimate. This allows for using the binomial distribution to calculate a probability of 
observing such a distribution given the null hypothesis that there is no effect. Therefore, I calculate 
the binomial probability of observing the distribution seen if both a positive and a negative sign are 
equally likely. This gives another tool for examining the direction and the significance of the effects. 
All regression result tables include the binomial probabilities under the coefficient estimates. 
The individual regressions are presented along with their results in the next section. 
(8) 
(9) 
 32 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Economic policy uncertainty and economic conditions 
Hypothesis 1 states that the level of policy certainty is higher when economic conditions are worse, 
since the government is more likely to change policy when economic conditions are weaker. To 
examine this, I run the following regression:  
qrQ,\ = L + d	[G?JQ,\ + D\	, 
where qrQ,\ is the economic policy uncertainty index for country V for month :, and [G?JQ,\ is 
respectively one of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). Given the hypothesis, the expected sign 
of d is negative. 
Since there is significant serial correlation in qrQ,\, I add a lagged version to the independent 
variables, after which the autocorrelation in the residuals is practically zero. The regression takes the 
form 
qrQ,\ = L + d	[G?JQ,\ + G	qrQ,\R9 + D\	. 
Table 3 reports the slope estimates for d and the p-values based on Newey-West standard errors, for 
all countries for which the individual economic policy uncertainty index is available as well as for 
Europe. 
For 19 of the 21 regressions, the sign of d is negative, as expected. Three of the estimates are 
significant at the 0.1% level, four at the 1% level, and four more at least at the 10% level, while ten 
of the estimates are not statistically significant. On a country level, none of the estimates are 
statistically significant for Germany and Spain, while the other countries show at least some support 
for the notion that policy uncertainty is higher in weaker economic conditions. However, subsample 
analysis reveals that the estimates for GDP growth for both Germany and Spain are statistically  
(10) 
(11) 
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Table 3 
Policy uncertainty and economic conditions 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 qrQ,\ = L + d	[G?JQ,\ + G	qrQ,\R9 + D\	 
 
where qrQ,\ is the economic policy uncertainty index for country V for month :, and [G?JQ,\ is respectively 
one of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and 
the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). Given the hypothesis, the expected sign of d is negative. To proxy policy 
uncertainty, I use the economic policy uncertainty indices by Baker et al. (2015). Both the equally weighted 
and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null 
hypothesis that both signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
 
  GDP growth ESI BCI 
France -4711,9 (0,000) *** -0,41 (0,048) * -0,54 (0,058) * 
Germany -1114,7 (0,161)  0,03 (0,888)  -0,01 (0,976)  
Italy -610,3 (0,317)  -0,85 (0,001) *** -0,73 (0,008) ** 
Netherlands -4934,3 (0,008) ** -1,97 (0,000) *** -2,67 (0,001) ** 
Spain -773,1 (0,465)  -0,04 (0,906)  -0,02 (0,962)  
UK -1233,9 (0,054) * -0,22 (0,308)  0,18 (0,257)  
Europe -2144,5 (0,001) ** -0,28 (0,026) * -0,16 (0,376)   
N (total) 7   7   7   
N (success) 7   6   6   
P 0,00   0,01   0,01   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
  
 34 
significant for the period from 2005 to 2015, at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The estimates are 
also both negative and economically more significant for the subsample period for the two countries. 
In addition, I calculate the binomial probability for the signs of the slopes being as estimated, given 
the null hypothesis that a positive and a negative slope are equally likely to be found. For all three 
measures, if there was truly no relation, the probability of seeing the number of negative signs as 
estimated is essentially zero. The results of the binomial tests are reported in table 3 as well. 
Therefore, the evidence does support the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between 
policy uncertainty and economic conditions. 
4.2 Stock return synchronicity and economic policy uncertainty 
4.2.1 Intra-country synchronicity 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that stock return synchronicity is higher when policy uncertainty is higher, 
since the political risk premium, which is intuitively higher when policy uncertainty is higher, cannot 
be fully diversified. To investigate the hypothesis, I run the following regression:  
gQ,\ = L + d	qrQ,\ + D\	, 
where gQ,\ is the intra-country synchronicity for country V for month :, and qrQ,\ is the respective 
level of economic policy uncertainty. Following the hypothesis, the expected sign of d is positive. 
Since there is significant serial correlation in gQ,\, I again add a lagged version to the independent 
variables, after which the autocorrelation in the residuals is practically zero. Then, the regression is 
the following: 
gQ,\ = L + d	qrQ,\ + G	gQ,\R9 + D\	. 
I repeat the regression first using the individual policy uncertainty indices for the 6 countries 
available, and then for all 27 countries using the common European policy uncertainty index. In 
(12) 
(13) 
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addition, both are repeated for equally weighted and value-weighted market returns. The estimates 
for coefficients d as well as their Newey-West p-values are reported in table 4. 
Using the country-specific economic policy uncertainty indices, 10 out of 12 estimates are positive 
as expected. Four of them are significant at the 0.1% level, two at the 1% level, and two at the 5% 
level. In total, 8 of the 12 estimates are significant at least at the 5% level. Furthermore, all of the 
significant estimates are positive. I calculate the binomial probabilities to see the number of positive 
estimates observed, given the null hypothesis that a positive and negative sign would be equally 
likely, or that there would be no relation between synchronicity and policy uncertainty. For both 
equally weighted and value-weighted measures of synchronicity, the probability of observing this 
many positive estimates if there was no relation is less than 2%. In total, observing 10 positive signs 
of 12 trials if both signs were equally likely is less than 0.4%. 
While not statistically significant for all countries, specifically the Netherlands, the evidence supports 
the hypothesis that higher policy uncertainty is associated with higher stock return synchronicity. 
Next, I proxy for policy uncertainty with the common European policy uncertainty index. For the 
equally-weighted synchronicity measure, 17 of the 27 estimates have the expected positive sign. Nine 
estimates are significant at the 0.1% level, four at the 1% level, and seven at the 10% level. In total, 
20 of the 27 estimates are significant at least at the 10% level. For the value-weighted synchronicity 
measure, 19 of the 27 estimates have a positive sign. Seven coefficients are significant at the 0.1% 
level, five at the 1% level, and a total of 15 at least at the 10% level. 
Interestingly, both the equally weighted and the value-weighted estimate for the Netherlands are now 
significant at least at the 5% level, and have the expected positive sign. This may be due to the fact 
that while the European policy uncertainty index covers the full period from 1990 to 2015, the index 
for the Netherlands only spans the period 2003 to 2015, or only 156 months. This is exactly half the 
number of observations as for the full European index. If the lesser statistical power is due to the 
lesser number of observations, it may actually imply further support for the hypothesis. A simple 
regression of qr_p,tpmuvKwx on qrklmnop shows that the two indices are strongly related (t = 6.88), 
which further supports the view that a longer sample period for the individual country index would 
likely show stronger results as well. 
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Table 4 
Stock synchronicity and political uncertainty (Intra-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 gQ,\ = L + d	qrQ,\ + G	gQ,\R9 + D\	. 
 
where gQ,\ is the intra-country synchronicity for country V for month :, and qrQ,\ is the respective level of economic policy 
uncertainty. The expected b is positive. To proxy policy uncertainty, I use the economic policy uncertainty indices by 
Baker et al. (2015). Both the equally weighted and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, 
binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
  EW     VW   
Country PU Index 
France 0,0001 (0,000) ***  0,0015 (0,000) *** 
Germany 0,0001 (0,025) *  0,0016 (0,000) *** 
Italy 0,0003 (0,047) *  0,0022 (0,006) ** 
Netherlands 0,0000 (0,921)   0,0001 (0,904)  
Spain 0,0001 (0,001) **  0,0005 (0,365)  
UK 0,0002 (0,000) ***   -0,0011 (0,152)   
N (total) 6    6   
N (success) 5    5   
P 0,02    0,02   
European PU Index 
Austria -0,0003 (0,763)   0,0009 (0,054) * 
Belgium 0,0002 (0,836)   0,0020 (0,001) ** 
Bulgaria -0,0038 (0,019) *  0,0020 (0,273)  
Croatia 0,0050 (0,004) **  0,0024 (0,007) ** 
Cyprus -0,0048 (0,001) ***  -0,0006 (0,186)  
Czech 0,0072 (0,000) ***  0,0024 (0,035) * 
Denmark -0,0019 (0,059) *  0,0005 (0,283)  
Estonia 0,0015 (0,333)   0,0004 (0,526)  
Finland 0,0036 (0,001) ***  0,0032 (0,000) *** 
France 0,0026 (0,000) ***  0,0021 (0,000) *** 
Germany 0,0001 (0,839)   0,0016 (0,001) ** 
Greece -0,0021 (0,141)   -0,0003 (0,594)  
Hungary 0,0034 (0,005) **  0,0016 (0,032) * 
Ireland 0,0000 (0,957)   0,0015 (0,007) ** 
Italy 0,0027 (0,000) ***  0,0025 (0,000) *** 
Latvia -0,0038 (0,070) *  0,0000 (0,994)  
Lithuania -0,0040 (0,014) *  0,0011 (0,174)  
Luxembourg 0,0056 (0,002) **  0,0049 (0,000) *** 
Malta -0,0017 (0,071) *  -0,0006 (0,219)  
Netherlands 0,0019 (0,038) *  0,0038 (0,000) *** 
Poland 0,0017 (0,090) *  0,0000 (0,973)  
Portugal 0,0033 (0,000) ***  0,0022 (0,000) *** 
Slovakia -0,0130 (0,000) ***  0,0045 (0,000) *** 
Slovenia 0,0044 (0,005) **  -0,0010 (0,239)  
Spain 0,0000 (0,966)   -0,0005 (0,394)  
Sweden 0,0044 (0,000) ***  0,0029 (0,002) ** 
UK 0,0053 (0,000) ***   -0,0012 (0,345)   
N (total) 27    27   
N (success) 17    19   
P 0,06    0,01   
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10%
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For the European policy uncertainty index, the binomial distribution shows that there is a 6% (EW) 
and 1% (VW) chance for the observed numbers of positive slope signs if there was no relation 
between policy uncertainty and synchronicity. Combined, there is less than a 0.5% chance of 
observing so many positive signs if there was no relation.  
In total, 36 of the 43 statistically significant estimates have the expected positive sign. 
Therefore, on average the empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that higher economic 
policy uncertainty is associated with higher intra-country stock return synchronicity. 
4.2.2 Inter-country synchronicity 
To examine the inter-country synchronicity, I run a similar regression:  
gQ,\ = L + d	qrQ,\ + G	gQ,\R9 + D\	, 
where gQ,\ is now the inter-country synchronicity for country V for month :, and qrQ,\ is the respective 
level of country policy uncertainty or European policy uncertainty. The expected sign of d is again 
positive, since higher policy uncertainty is expected to be associated with higher synchronicity. 
Table 5 reports the coefficients d and their Newey-West p-values. For country policy uncertainty, 
five out of six estimates are positive for both equally and value-weighted measures. I total 10 of the 
12 estimates as significant at least at the 10% level. Moreover, all significant estimates are positive. 
For common European policy uncertainty, using the equally weighted country-level indices, 17 out 
of 27 estimates have the expected positive sign, and using the value-weighted country-level indices, 
25 of the 27 estimates have the expected sign. This is a clear first suggestion that synchronicity 
between the European countries increases with the level of policy uncertainty. Especially for the 
value-weighted indices, the results are also highly significant: 12 estimates are significant at the 0.1% 
level, five at the 1% level, and a total of 21 out of 27 at least at the 10% level. 
  
(14) 
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Table 5 
Stock synchronicity and political uncertainty (Inter-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 gQ,\ = L + d	qrQ,\ + G	gQ,\R9 + D\ 
 
where gQ,\ is the inter-country synchronicity for country V for month :, and qrQ,\ is the level of country policy uncertainty 
or European policy uncertainty. The expected b is positive. To proxy policy uncertainty, I use the economic policy 
uncertainty indices by Baker et al. (2015). Both the equally weighted and value-weighted synchronicity measures are 
reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
  EW     VW   
Country PU Index 
France 0,0001 (0,000) ***  0,0015 (0,000) *** 
Germany 0,0001 (0,025) *  0,0016 (0,000) *** 
Italy 0,0003 (0,047) *  0,0022 (0,006) ** 
Netherlands -0,0000 (0,921)   0,0001 (0,904)  
Spain 0,0001 (0,001) **  0,0005 (0,365)  
UK 0,0002 (0,000) ***  -0,0011 (0,152)  
N (total) 6    6   
N (success) 5    5   
P 0,02    0,02   
European PU Index 
Austria 0,0006 (0,034) *  0,0011 (0,000) *** 
Belgium 0,0002 (0,521)   0,0010 (0,001) ** 
Bulgaria -0,0001 (0,397)   0,0000 (0,794)  
Croatia 0,0002 (0,256)   0,0005 (0,007) ** 
Cyprus 0,0000 (0,962)   -0,0004 (0,161)  
Czech 0,0003 (0,116)   0,0010 (0,001) *** 
Denmark 0,0009 (0,005) **  0,0008 (0,004) ** 
Estonia 0,0005 (0,068) *  -0,0002 (0,146)  
Finland 0,0010 (0,000) ***  0,0013 (0,000) *** 
France 0,0013 (0,000) ***  0,0009 (0,000) *** 
Germany 0,0004 (0,200)   0,0012 (0,000) *** 
Greece 0,0002 (0,231)   0,0005 (0,032) * 
Hungary 0,0006 (0,010) **  0,0005 (0,052) * 
Ireland 0,0004 (0,065) *  0,0013 (0,001) *** 
Italy 0,0008 (0,003) **  0,0009 (0,000) *** 
Latvia -0,0001 (0,459)   0,0003 (0,013) * 
Lithuania -0,0002 (0,353)   0,0005 (0,073) * 
Luxembourg 0,0000 (0,989)   0,0015 (0,000) *** 
Malta -0,0003 (0,004) **  0,0001 (0,434)  
Netherlands 0,0006 (0,023) *  0,0011 (0,000) *** 
Poland 0,0007 (0,024) *  0,0009 (0,001) *** 
Portugal 0,0009 (0,000) ***  0,0012 (0,000) *** 
Slovakia -0,0003 (0,037) *  0,0000 (0,881)  
Slovenia -0,0002 (0,219)   0,0002 (0,166)  
Spain -0,0001 (0,540)   0,0011 (0,000) *** 
Sweden 0,0006 (0,043) *  0,0007 (0,002) ** 
UK -0,0001 (0,844)     0,0007 (0,008) ** 
N (total) 27    27   
N (success) 17    25   
P 0,06    0,00   
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10 
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Given the sign distribution and the significance, the empirical evidence supports the view that stock 
return synchronicity between the European countries increases with both country policy uncertainty 
and the common European policy uncertainty. 
4.3 Stock return synchronicity and economic conditions 
4.3.1 Intra-country synchronicity 
Hypothesis 3 states that stock return synchronicity is expected to be higher when economic conditions 
are weaker. This follows directly from the first two hypotheses: if policy uncertainty is higher when 
economic conditions are weaker, and if synchronicity is higher when policy uncertainty is higher, we 
would naturally also expect synchronicity to be higher when economic conditions are weaker. To 
examine this, I run the following regression:  
gQ,\ = L + d	[G?JQ,\ + D\	, 
where gQ,\ is the intra-country synchronicity for country V for month :, and [G?JQ,\ is respectively 
one of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator 
(ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). Given the hypothesis, the expected sign of d is 
negative. 
Again, to counter the serial correlation in the synchronicity, I add the lagged synchronicity, after 
which there is no significant autocorrelation in the error terms:  
gQ,\ = L + d	[G?JQ,\ + G	gQ,\R9 + D\	. 
I repeat the regression for the synchronicity measures based on equally weighted and value-weighted 
market returns. The estimates for coefficients d as well as their Newey-West p-values are reported in 
table 6. 
Let us first review the results for the synchronicity based on equally weighted market returns. First, 
for GDP growth, 17 out of 21 regressions with available data have an expected negative sign for the 
slope coefficient. In total, 10 out of 21 are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Second, 
(15) 
(16) 
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for the ESI, just 12 of 26 coefficients have the expected negative sign. Similarly, only nine are 
statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Third, for the BCI, 18 out of 26 coefficients have the 
expected negative sign, but only nine are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. 
Next, consider the value-weighted synchronicity measure. For GDP growth, 13 out of 21 coefficients 
have the expected negative sign, and eight are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. For 
the ESI, 14 out of 26 estimates have a negative sign, and nine are significant at least at the 5% level. 
Finally, for the BCI, 17 out of 26 estimates have a negative sign, and seven are significant at least at 
the 10% level. 
Again, I calculate the binomial probability for observing such results if there is no relation. For GDP 
growth, the probabilities are 0.1% (EW) and 9.5% (VW). For the ESI, the probabilities are much 
higher at 57.7% (EW) and 27.9% (VW). And for the BCI, the probabilities are 1.4% (EW) and 3.8% 
(VW). While GDP growth and the BCI provide some support for the argument that there may be a 
relation, the ESI does not provide any evidence for my hypothesis or for the opposite hypothesis. 
Generally, the evidence provides only some support for the hypothesis that synchronicity is higher 
when economic conditions are lower. It can hardly be said based on these results that there would be 
a universal effect. Furthermore, some of the most significant estimates seem to have a positive, 
unexpected sign. For instance, five out of the six estimates are highly significant for Greece, and all 
six have an unexpected positive sign. Similarly, all four available estimates for Cyprus are highly 
significant and have a positive sign. Both countries still have an expected positive relationship 
between synchronicity and policy uncertainty, as can be seen in the results regarding the previous 
hypothesis. 
On the other hand, in some countries there is an expected relation. For instance, for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and the Netherlands, synchronicity seems to be clearly higher when GDP growth 
is lower. 
Interestingly, even though the first two hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence, the third 
related hypothesis receives on average only dubious support from the results. The effect is highly 
dependent on the country, in both direction and significance.
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Table 6 
Stock synchronicity and economic conditions (Intra-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+,-",$ + +	!",$./ + 0$	 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+,-",$ is respectively one of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). The expected sign of ( is negative. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted 
synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
  GDP growth ESI BCI   GDP growth ESI BCI 
Austria -14,12 (0,228)  0,003 (0,231)  0,004 (0,162)   -7,04 (0,288)  0,001 (0,509)  0,002 (0,341)  
Belgium -16,21 (0,175)  -0,001 (0,713)  -0,002 (0,581)   -11,98 (0,092) * 0,002 (0,323)  0,004 (0,100) * 
Bulgaria NA NA  -0,003 (0,730)  -0,012 (0,169)   NA NA  0,002 (0,819)  0,001 (0,960)  
Croatia NA NA  -0,009 (0,136)  -0,013 (0,049) *  NA NA  -0,004 (0,596)  -0,007 (0,380)  
Cyprus NA NA  0,015 (0,000) *** 0,012 (0,000) ***  NA NA  0,006 (0,010) * 0,005 (0,006) ** 
Czech -15,73 (0,004) ** 0,000 (0,847)  0,000 (0,992)   -24,51 (0,005) ** -0,021 (0,002) ** -0,014 (0,002) ** 
Denmark -9,64 (0,203)  -0,006 (0,104)  -0,002 (0,576)   -10,76 (0,125)  -0,005 (0,036) * -0,003 (0,165)  
Estonia -11,17 (0,012) * -0,007 (0,224)  -0,007 (0,150)   2,50 (0,434)  0,002 (0,454)  0,001 (0,585)  
Finland -5,97 (0,371)  0,000 (0,992)  -0,002 (0,281)   -5,29 (0,287)  0,000 (0,840)  -0,002 (0,239)  
France -22,63 (0,029) * 0,001 (0,559)  0,002 (0,328)   -21,10 (0,006) ** 0,000 (0,813)  0,000 (0,917)  
Germany -2,03 (0,816)  0,004 (0,084) * 0,002 (0,241)   9,36 (0,228)  0,005 (0,016) * 0,004 (0,010) ** 
Greece 11,70 (0,009) ** 0,013 (0,000) *** 0,011 (0,000) ***  7,25 (0,111)  0,012 (0,000) *** 0,010 (0,001) *** 
Hungary -25,18 (0,000) *** -0,008 (0,021) * -0,002 (0,684)   -10,74 (0,022) * -0,007 (0,015) * -0,001 (0,797)  
Ireland -2,08 (0,383)  NA NA  NA NA   -3,89 (0,043) * NA NA  NA NA  
Italy -21,44 (0,006) ** 0,000 (0,902)  -0,001 (0,732)   -21,78 (0,012) * -0,003 (0,185)  -0,003 (0,155)  
Latvia NA NA  0,005 (0,378)  -0,001 (0,906)   NA NA  -0,001 (0,813)  -0,001 (0,829)  
Lithuania NA NA  -0,007 (0,037) * -0,005 (0,064) *  NA NA  -0,005 (0,247)  -0,003 (0,431)  
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Luxembourg 4,00 (0,409)  -0,020 (0,138)  -0,007 (0,102)   -6,68 (0,176)  -0,010 (0,010) ** -0,005 (0,031) * 
Malta NA NA  -0,012 (0,002) ** -0,013 (0,002) **  NA NA  -0,004 (0,188)  -0,001 (0,732)  
Netherlands -18,34 (0,067) * 0,002 (0,287)  0,007 (0,055) *  -46,64 (0,000) *** -0,003 (0,219)  -0,003 (0,502)  
Poland 3,14 (0,671)  0,007 (0,097) * -0,004 (0,551)   6,73 (0,475)  0,011 (0,029) * -0,004 (0,616)  
Portugal -15,62 (0,031) * -0,002 (0,502)  -0,004 (0,292)   -16,67 (0,008) ** -0,002 (0,332)  -0,002 (0,422)  
Slovakia 24,60 (0,254)  0,032 (0,000) *** 0,015 (0,030) *  -19,46 (0,371)  -0,013 (0,000) *** -0,012 (0,011) * 
Slovenia -70,76 (0,000) *** 0,000 (0,958)  -0,001 (0,866)   7,20 (0,322)  0,003 (0,379)  -0,004 (0,268)  
Spain -7,21 (0,507)  -0,009 (0,068) * -0,010 (0,046) *  7,64 (0,358)  0,000 (0,967)  -0,001 (0,528)  
Sweden -1,76 (0,781)  0,007 (0,106)  -0,007 (0,033) *  4,37 (0,740)  0,005 (0,409)  -0,010 (0,194)  
UK -12,26 (0,021) * 0,004 (0,299)   0,005 (0,154)     6,99 (0,615)   0,008 (0,119)   0,003 (0,375)   
N (total) 21   26   26    21   26   26   
N (success) 17   12   18    13   14   17   
P 0,00   0,58   0,01    0,09   0,28   0,04   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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4.3.2 Inter-country synchronicity 
To investigate whether the inter-country synchronicity depends on economic conditions, I run the 
following regression:  
!",$ = & + (	*+,-",$ + +	!",$./ + 0$	, 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+,-",$ is respectively 
one of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator 
(ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). Given the hypothesis, the expected sign of ( is 
negative. 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients ( and their Newey-West p-values. For GDP growth, 17 
(EW) and 18 (VW) out of the 21 estimates have the expected positive sign. 25 of the 42 estimates are 
statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The ESI and BCI measures provide no significant 
support for the notion that weaker economic conditions would drive synchronicity higher. 
On average, the results are similar to the intra-country examination. While weaker GDP growth seems 
to drive inter-country synchronicity higher more so than the intra-country synchronicity, the other 
two measures of economic conditions are insignificant. However, since GDP growth is arguably a 
more prestigious and widely used measure of economic conditions, the empirical evidence seems to 
provide some support for the hypothesis that inter-country synchronicity is higher when economic 
conditions are weaker.
(17) 
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Table 7  
Stock synchronicity and economic conditions (Inter-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+,-",$ + +	!",$./ + 0$	 
 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+,-",$ is respectively one of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). The expected sign of ( is negative. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted 
synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
  GDP growth ESI BCI   GDP growth ESI BCI 
Austria -5,95 (0,329)  0,002 (0,293)  0,001 (0,326)   -4,16 (0,337)  0,001 (0,693)  0,001 (0,679)  
Belgium -12,69 (0,028) * 0,002 (0,134)  0,002 (0,166)   -2,47 (0,537)  0,001 (0,374)  0,002 (0,149)  
Bulgaria NA NA  0,001 (0,074) * 0,001 (0,173)   NA NA  -0,001 (0,098) * -0,001 (0,224)  
Croatia NA NA  0,000 (0,906)  0,000 (0,889)   NA NA  -0,004 (0,009) ** -0,006 (0,003) ** 
Cyprus NA NA  0,002 (0,043) * 0,002 (0,011) *  NA NA  0,004 (0,033) * 0,004 (0,003) ** 
Czech -4,19 (0,001) ** -0,002 (0,018) * -0,002 (0,028) *  -12,21 (0,000) *** -0,001 (0,302)  -0,002 (0,174)  
Denmark -8,37 (0,014) * 0,001 (0,738)  0,000 (0,823)   -8,28 (0,086) * 0,001 (0,508)  -0,001 (0,571)  
Estonia -3,65 (0,001) ** -0,002 (0,118)  -0,002 (0,037) *  0,68 (0,172)  0,000 (0,490)  0,000 (0,482)  
Finland -1,85 (0,493)  0,002 (0,290)  -0,001 (0,243)   2,01 (0,563)  0,002 (0,236)  -0,002 (0,127)  
France -16,60 (0,012) * 0,001 (0,374)  0,001 (0,470)   -7,88 (0,073) * 0,002 (0,178)  0,002 (0,209)  
Germany -5,90 (0,094) * 0,002 (0,262)  0,002 (0,144)   -2,95 (0,428)  0,001 (0,618)  0,002 (0,199)  
Greece -2,75 (0,070) * 0,000 (0,729)  0,000 (0,615)   -4,80 (0,023) * -0,002 (0,096) * -0,002 (0,052) * 
Hungary -3,27 (0,012) * -0,003 (0,009) ** -0,001 (0,540)   -2,74 (0,086) * -0,003 (0,027) * -0,001 (0,682)  
Ireland -2,58 (0,018) * NA NA  NA NA   -1,17 (0,310)  NA NA  NA NA  
Italy -11,37 (0,004) ** 0,001 (0,690)  0,000 (0,962)   -11,46 (0,002) ** 0,000 (0,741)  0,000 (0,957)  
Latvia NA NA  0,000 (0,851)  -0,001 (0,287)   NA NA  0,000 (0,647)  0,000 (0,589)  
Lithuania NA NA  -0,001 (0,532)  0,000 (0,715)   NA NA  -0,001 (0,186)  -0,001 (0,206)  
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Luxembourg 1,22 (0,470)  0,001 (0,122)  0,001 (0,300)   -0,64 (0,703)  -0,002 (0,085) * -0,001 (0,243)  
Malta NA NA  -0,002 (0,004) ** -0,001 (0,015) *  NA NA  0,000 (0,618)  0,000 (0,991)  
Netherlands -7,52 (0,041) * 0,001 (0,329)  0,002 (0,420)   -14,69 (0,000) *** 0,000 (0,823)  0,001 (0,707)  
Poland 5,59 (0,073) * -0,002 (0,267)  0,001 (0,686)   1,26 (0,704)  -0,002 (0,186)  0,003 (0,303)  
Portugal -8,34 (0,009) ** -0,001 (0,161)  -0,002 (0,153)   -12,42 (0,000) *** -0,001 (0,538)  -0,001 (0,650)  
Slovakia 2,46 (0,082) * 0,001 (0,079) * 0,001 (0,143)   -0,39 (0,495)  0,000 (0,404)  0,000 (0,679)  
Slovenia -0,61 (0,607)  0,002 (0,039) * 0,001 (0,438)   -3,97 (0,072) * -0,001 (0,465)  -0,002 (0,033) * 
Spain 0,61 (0,688)  0,000 (0,310)  0,000 (0,784)   -10,22 (0,000) *** 0,000 (0,696)  0,002 (0,282)  
Sweden -2,73 (0,550)  0,001 (0,198)  0,000 (0,876)   -3,48 (0,381)  0,003 (0,022) * 0,001 (0,466)  
UK -1,28 (0,684)   0,001 (0,068) * 0,000 (0,903)     -11,36 (0,001) ** 0,001 (0,449)   0,001 (0,607)   
N (total) 21   26   26    21   26   26   
N (success) 17   9   13    18   12   13   
P 0,00   0,92   0,42    0,00   0,58   0,42   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10%
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4.4 Stock return synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and economic conditions 
4.4.1 Intra-country synchronicity 
Hypothesis 4 states that policy uncertainty has a stronger effect on synchronicity when economic 
conditions are weaker. To test the hypothesis, I run the following regression with an interaction term: 
!",$ = & + (	*+",$	,-./",$ + -	*+",$ + 0	,-./",$ + 1$	, 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 2 for month 3, *+",$ is respective level of 
economic policy uncertainty, and ,-./",$ is respectively one of the three measures of economic 
conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator 
(BCI). The expected sign of ( is negative, since the effect *+ has is expected to be higher when ,-./ 
is lower. 
To account for the serial correlation in !",$, I add the lagged synchronicity to the independent 
variables, and calculate all significance statistics with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent Newey-West standard errors. With the lag, the regression takes the following form:  
!",$ = & + (	*+",$	,-./",$ + -	*+",$ + 0	,-./",$ + 1	!",$45 + 1$ 
I repeat the regression first using the individual policy uncertainty indices for the 6 countries 
available, and then for all 27 countries using the common European policy uncertainty index. In 
addition, I run the tests for synchronicity measures based on equally weighted and value-weighted 
market returns, for all three proxies of economic conditions. 
The results for the regressions using the individual country indices for policy uncertainty are 
presented in table 8. For GDP growth, four out of six estimates have the expected negative sign, for 
both equally weighted and value-weighted measures of synchronicity. For the ESI and the BCI, only 
six out of the remaining 24 estimates have the expected sign, and all estimates for the ESI and the 
BCI are also very close to zero. Furthermore, only four out of all 36 coefficients are statistically 
significant even at the 10% level. Even though the binomial distribution suggests that it would be 
somewhat unlikely to see such results for the state-dependency on GDP growth if there actually is no 
(18) 
(19) 
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dependency (11% probability for both EW and VW, 7% combined), the results as a whole suggest 
that the effect of the individual policy uncertainty indices on synchronicity seems to have no state-
dependency on economic conditions. 
Using the common European policy uncertainty index as a proxy for policy uncertainty for the 27 
countries in the sample yields similar results. In total, 64 of all 146 coefficients estimated have the 
expected negative sign, which means that generally nothing can be said about the direction of the 
effect. Also, only 25 of the 146 estimates are statistically significant even at the 10% level. The results 
are reported in table 9. 
When examining individual countries in the latter specification, there are some exceptions. Most 
notably, there is a clear dependency on GDP growth in Finland for both equally weighted and value-
weighted synchronicity measures, significant at the 1% level. The sign is also as expected: policy 
uncertainty seems to induce significantly more synchronicity when GDP growth is slower13. While 
not quite as significant, a similar effect for the Czech Republic is visible in the results for the three 
measures of economic conditions. 
For all specifications of the regression, the direct association between stock return synchronicity and 
policy uncertainty (coefficient -) remains significant, with very similar results as those discussed in 
section 4.2. 
 
                                                
13 However, this does not qualify as a test of causality, but merely association.  
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Table 8 
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and economic conditions (Intra-country, Country PU Index) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+",$	,-./",$ + -	*+",$ + 0	,-./",$ + 1$ 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 2 for month 3, *+",$ is the respective level of economic policy uncertainty, and ,-./",$ is respectively one of 
the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). The expected sign of ( 
is negative. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both 
signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
  EW   VW 
  GDP growth ESI BCI   GDP growth ESI BCI 
France -0,13 (0,451)  -9,8E-06 (0,783)  -2,0E-05 (0,570)   -0,01 (0,959)  1,6E-05 (0,574)  1,1E-05 (0,714)  
Germany -0,29 (0,011) * -4,9E-05 (0,301)  -8,6E-06 (0,814)   -0,17 (0,087) * 4,2E-05 (0,276)  4,1E-05 (0,147)  
Italy -0,09 (0,709)  1,0E-04 (0,159)  5,9E-05 (0,552)   -0,10 (0,649)  1,2E-04 (0,102)  7,8E-05 (0,389)  
Netherlands 0,19 (0,216)  1,1E-04 (0,069) * 1,1E-04 (0,149)   0,05 (0,796)  6,1E-05 (0,293)  1,2E-04 (0,110)  
Spain -0,32 (0,189)  -4,4E-05 (0,677)  -8,9E-06 (0,936)   0,23 (0,255)  9,4E-05 (0,292)  1,1E-04 (0,229)  
UK 0,03 (0,583)   3,3E-05 (0,117)   2,6E-05 (0,231)     -0,24 (0,338)   2,4E-04 (0,007) ** 1,4E-04 (0,152)   
N (total) 6   6   6    6   6   6   
N (success) 4   3   3    4   0   0   
P 0,11   0,34   0,34    0,11   0,98   0,98   
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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Table 9  
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and economic conditions (Intra-country, European PU Index) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+456789,$	,-./",$ + -	*+456789,$ + 0	,-./",$ + 1$ 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 2 for month 3, *+456789,$ is level of European economic policy uncertainty, and ,-./",$ is respectively one 
of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). The expected sign of ( is negative. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both 
signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
  EW   VW 
  GDP growth ESI BCI   GDP growth ESI BCI 
Austria -0,19 (0,476)  -2,6E-05 (0,736)  -3,4E-05 (0,683)   -0,16 (0,263)  -5,1E-05 (0,385)  -5,0E-05 (0,413)  
Belgium -0,41 (0,248)  4,3E-05 (0,518)  3,5E-05 (0,640)   0,15 (0,457)  9,0E-05 (0,124)  7,5E-05 (0,259)  
Bulgaria NA NA  4,1E-04 (0,000) *** 4,5E-04 (0,000) ***  NA NA  -1,1E-04 (0,465)  -3,5E-04 (0,093) * 
Croatia NA NA  -2,3E-04 (0,276)  -3,9E-04 (0,086) *  NA NA  -1,1E-04 (0,509)  -1,1E-04 (0,557)  
Cyprus NA NA  2,1E-05 (0,740)  7,6E-05 (0,191)   NA NA  -1,5E-05 (0,789)  6,8E-06 (0,897)  
Czech 0,13 (0,206)  -9,9E-05 (0,027) * -9,4E-05 (0,060) *  -0,56 (0,017) * -3,4E-04 (0,001) ** -2,9E-04 (0,002) ** 
Denmark 0,03 (0,881)  8,8E-05 (0,216)  5,7E-06 (0,950)   -0,16 (0,352)  6,2E-06 (0,933)  -5,0E-05 (0,529)  
Estonia -0,21 (0,140)  -2,1E-04 (0,176)  -1,7E-04 (0,213)   -0,02 (0,881)  -3,5E-05 (0,666)  -1,6E-05 (0,748)  
Finland -0,37 (0,002) ** -6,9E-05 (0,487)  -6,1E-05 (0,411)   -0,28 (0,002) ** -4,5E-06 (0,955)  -6,9E-05 (0,259)  
France -0,33 (0,262)  4,4E-05 (0,514)  2,3E-05 (0,727)   -0,12 (0,608)  6,2E-05 (0,224)  6,0E-05 (0,235)  
Germany -0,48 (0,023) * -1,3E-04 (0,027) * -7,5E-05 (0,148)   -0,30 (0,140)  -2,1E-05 (0,699)  -1,1E-05 (0,790)  
Greece 0,02 (0,887)  -4,2E-05 (0,581)  -8,2E-06 (0,904)   0,08 (0,474)  -3,0E-05 (0,688)  -1,4E-06 (0,985)  
Hungary -0,04 (0,720)  -1,8E-05 (0,813)  -2,1E-05 (0,876)   -0,12 (0,279)  -2,8E-05 (0,741)  -9,5E-05 (0,457)  
Ireland -0,02 (0,563)  NA NA  NA NA   0,05 (0,114)  NA NA  NA NA  
Italy 0,04 (0,838)  7,7E-05 (0,096) * 5,7E-05 (0,380)   0,01 (0,958)  1,0E-04 (0,021) * 8,3E-05 (0,146)  
Latvia NA NA  3,6E-04 (0,104)  3,4E-04 (0,041) *  NA NA  4,8E-05 (0,769)  -3,2E-05 (0,807)  
Lithuania NA NA  1,5E-04 (0,092) * 1,6E-04 (0,066) *  NA NA  -2,2E-04 (0,081) * -1,1E-04 (0,248)  
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Luxembourg 0,19 (0,063) * -3,1E-04 (0,250)  -1,8E-04 (0,196)   -0,12 (0,235)  1,0E-04 (0,387)  6,8E-05 (0,318)  
Malta NA NA  2,1E-05 (0,811)  -1,2E-05 (0,892)   NA NA  -1,9E-05 (0,752)  -1,6E-05 (0,743)  
Netherlands 0,18 (0,405)  1,3E-04 (0,069) * 2,0E-04 (0,147)   -0,07 (0,799)  8,3E-05 (0,310)  1,5E-04 (0,327)  
Poland 0,14 (0,319)  8,2E-05 (0,234)  3,0E-05 (0,819)   0,17 (0,264)  5,6E-05 (0,491)  4,1E-05 (0,790)  
Portugal 0,09 (0,517)  7,2E-05 (0,166)  8,7E-05 (0,253)   0,11 (0,353)  1,8E-05 (0,640)  2,3E-05 (0,681)  
Slovakia -0,17 (0,677)  -8,9E-05 (0,595)  -2,2E-05 (0,907)   0,47 (0,036) * 1,3E-04 (0,129)  1,3E-04 (0,175)  
Slovenia 0,44 (0,064) * -1,4E-05 (0,905)  2,5E-06 (0,986)   0,18 (0,439)  4,5E-05 (0,601)  -9,5E-05 (0,181)  
Spain -0,07 (0,750)  2,6E-05 (0,744)  -1,4E-05 (0,862)   0,29 (0,123)  7,3E-05 (0,247)  6,6E-05 (0,299)  
Sweden 0,14 (0,151)  -6,8E-05 (0,290)  1,3E-04 (0,002) **  0,13 (0,474)  1,4E-05 (0,887)  2,0E-04 (0,063) * 
UK -0,12 (0,437)   -9,1E-05 (0,140)   -4,9E-05 (0,457)     -0,35 (0,282)   1,9E-04 (0,177)   -7,6E-05 (0,529)   
N (total) 21   26   26    21   26   26   
N (success) 11   13   13    11   12   15   
P 0,33   0,42   0,42    0,33   0,58   0,16   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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4.4.2 Inter-country synchronicity 
To assess the inter-country effects, I run the regression 
!",$ = & + (	*+,-./01,$	2345",$ + 3	*+,-./01,$ + 6	2345",$ + 7	!",$89 + 7$	, 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country : for month ;, *+,-./01,$ is the level of 
European economic policy uncertainty, and 2345",$ is one of the three measures of economic 
conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator 
(BCI). The expected sign of ( is negative, since the effect *+ has is expected to be higher when 2345 
is lower. 
Table 10 reports the results. The inter-country results are very similar to the intra-country results: 
While some individual countries are affected, the sign distributions are indifferent, and only 25 of all 
146 coefficients reported are statistically significant even at the 10% level. Therefore, in general, the 
evidence does not seem to support the hypothesis that policy uncertainty would have a stronger effect 
on stock return synchronicity when economic conditions are worse. 
 
(20) 
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Table 10 
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and economic conditions (Inter-country, European PU Index) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+,-./01,$	2345",$ + 3	*+,-./01,$ + 6	2345",$ + 7$ 
 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 8 for month 9, *+,-./01,$ is level of European economic policy uncertainty, and 2345",$ is respectively one 
of the three measures of economic conditions: GDP growth, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and the Business Climate Indicator (BCI). The expected sign of ( is negative. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, binomial probabilities for the null hypothesis that both 
signs are equally likely are reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
  GDP growth ESI BCI   GDP growth ESI BCI 
Austria -0,14 (0,153)  -1,0E-05 (0,781)  -2,6E-05 (0,492)   -0,13 (0,125)  -2,1E-05 (0,518)  -1,9E-05 (0,612)  
Belgium -0,12 (0,429)  1,7E-06 (0,963)  -3,5E-06 (0,927)   0,07 (0,572)  3,6E-05 (0,232)  3,0E-05 (0,410)  
Bulgaria NA NA  4,7E-05 (0,004) ** 4,3E-05 (0,023) *  NA NA  2,4E-05 (0,411)  2,6E-05 (0,458)  
Croatia NA NA  3,6E-05 (0,289)  5,3E-05 (0,207)   NA NA  3,4E-05 (0,366)  5,0E-05 (0,232)  
Cyprus NA NA  4,3E-06 (0,816)  8,5E-06 (0,607)   NA NA  -1,6E-06 (0,959)  1,9E-05 (0,472)  
Czech -0,03 (0,345)  -2,7E-05 (0,115)  -1,7E-05 (0,412)   -0,11 (0,081) * -7,3E-05 (0,053) * -6,6E-05 (0,107)  
Denmark -0,05 (0,515)  -3,3E-05 (0,340)  -5,8E-05 (0,148)   -0,02 (0,798)  1,4E-06 (0,969)  -5,9E-05 (0,125)  
Estonia -0,06 (0,016) * -6,4E-05 (0,061) * -4,8E-05 (0,080) *  0,00 (0,891)  1,7E-06 (0,885)  1,1E-06 (0,908)  
Finland -0,10 (0,064) * -9,9E-06 (0,756)  -7,1E-06 (0,805)   -0,16 (0,001) *** -2,1E-05 (0,400)  -8,5E-06 (0,724)  
France -0,18 (0,175)  2,3E-06 (0,954)  -9,7E-06 (0,795)   -0,07 (0,505)  -5,3E-06 (0,835)  -9,4E-06 (0,730)  
Germany -0,23 (0,009) ** -9,2E-05 (0,005) ** -7,0E-05 (0,025) *  0,02 (0,848)  -1,1E-06 (0,969)  -2,7E-05 (0,280)  
Greece 0,07 (0,039) * 1,6E-05 (0,401)  2,0E-05 (0,345)   0,08 (0,038) * 1,2E-05 (0,518)  8,7E-06 (0,658)  
Hungary 0,03 (0,378)  2,3E-05 (0,384)  -2,4E-05 (0,601)   0,01 (0,837)  2,0E-05 (0,515)  1,8E-07 (0,997)  
Ireland 0,01 (0,568)  NA NA  NA NA   0,07 (0,002) ** NA NA  NA NA  
Italy 0,06 (0,498)  2,2E-05 (0,265)  9,2E-06 (0,765)   0,11 (0,123)  2,7E-05 (0,145)  1,7E-05 (0,492)  
Latvia NA NA  -1,5E-05 (0,745)  -1,2E-05 (0,732)   NA NA  -7,2E-05 (0,021) * -5,3E-05 (0,078) * 
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Lithuania NA NA  -8,7E-06 (0,815)  4,4E-06 (0,837)   NA NA  -7,8E-05 (0,056) * -5,2E-05 (0,071) * 
Luxembourg 0,07 (0,043) * 2,8E-06 (0,902)  -4,5E-06 (0,723)   -0,03 (0,267)  2,2E-05 (0,477)  1,2E-05 (0,481)  
Malta NA NA  7,1E-06 (0,557)  4,3E-06 (0,609)   NA NA  -3,4E-06 (0,838)  8,3E-07 (0,966)  
Netherlands -0,08 (0,449)  1,7E-05 (0,570)  2,1E-05 (0,694)   0,02 (0,760)  1,7E-06 (0,945)  -1,8E-05 (0,680)  
Poland 0,02 (0,735)  3,1E-05 (0,499)  1,2E-05 (0,869)   0,01 (0,932)  1,7E-05 (0,704)  -2,4E-05 (0,684)  
Portugal -0,02 (0,723)  7,2E-06 (0,730)  7,6E-06 (0,795)   0,03 (0,626)  8,5E-06 (0,649)  1,1E-05 (0,700)  
Slovakia -0,06 (0,049) * -1,6E-05 (0,365)  -2,0E-06 (0,901)   0,00 (0,808)  2,1E-06 (0,833)  3,7E-06 (0,692)  
Slovenia 0,04 (0,166)  1,2E-05 (0,551)  3,4E-06 (0,864)   0,01 (0,934)  2,1E-05 (0,125)  -6,4E-06 (0,780)  
Spain 0,00 (0,968)  9,8E-06 (0,249)  1,5E-05 (0,109)   0,14 (0,061) * 5,4E-06 (0,842)  -2,5E-05 (0,385)  
Sweden -0,10 (0,140)  -2,3E-06 (0,941)  1,2E-05 (0,764)   -0,07 (0,144)  -1,9E-05 (0,391)  7,8E-06 (0,765)  
UK -0,09 (0,245)   -9,7E-07 (0,973)   -5,8E-05 (0,021) *   -0,04 (0,554)   -4,3E-05 (0,083) * -6,6E-05 (0,001) ** 
N (total) 21   26   26    21   26   26   
N (success) 14   11   13    9   11   13   
P 0,04   0,72   0,42    0,67   0,72   0,42   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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4.5 Stock return synchronicity and the integration of the European Union 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 state that stock return synchronicity should be affected by joining the European 
Union and the euro area, as new political, economic, and financial factors are introduced. In addition, 
hypothesis 7 expects that the effect of joining the EU is generally stronger than that of joining the 
euro area. To examine these hypotheses, I run the following regression: 
!",$ = & + (	*+",$ + ,	*-./",$ + 0$ 
where !",$ is the synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, *+",$ is a binary variable which is 0 when 
the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after the country has joined the EU, and *-./",$ is a 
similar binary variable which is 1 after the country has adopted the euro. 
I add the lagged synchronicity to counter serial correlation, and calculate all significance statistics 
using Newey-West standard errors. Then, the regression is the following:  
!",$ = & + (	*+",$ + ,	*-./",$ + 3	!",$45 + 0$. 
Due to the availability periods of value-weighted stock market indices for many of the countries, 
regressions using the value-weighted measures for stock return synchronicity would not be possible 
or statistically sound for the effect of joining the EU. For many countries, the date of joining the EU 
is either before the availability of an index, or so shortly after the joining date that the number of 
monthly observations before the date would be clearly too small. Therefore, the results for joining 
the EU are only discussed for the equally weighted measure of synchronicity which does not suffer 
from the problem. 
During the sample period from 1990 to 2015, 15 of the 27 countries joined the EU, and the remaining 
12 countries were already member states at the beginning of the period. All euro area members in the 
sample adopted the currency at some point during the sample period, since the euro was first 
implemented in 1999 which is in the middle of the period.  
(21) 
(22) 
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4.5.1 Inter-country synchronicity 
Let us first examine the inter-country synchronicity. Now, !",$ in equation 22 is the inter-country 
stock return synchronicity based on country-level stock market indices. Both coefficients ( and , are 
expected to be positive, as synchronicity between the countries is expected to increase with the level 
of integration. 
Table 11 reports the results for joining the European Union. As discussed above, the value-weighted 
synchronicity measure is ignored in this case due to the mismatch of the joining dates and available 
index data for the relevant countries. Out of 15 estimates, ten have the expected positive sign, and the 
average value is also positive (0.038). Ten estimates are statistically significant at least at the 10% 
level. The binomial probability of observing this sign distribution if both signs were equally likely is 
somewhat low at 6%. Moreover, eight of the ten statistically significant estimates have a positive 
sign. 
Table 12 presents the respective results for adopting the euro. For the equally weighted measure, 13 
out of 19 estimates have the expected positive sign. For the value-weighted measure, 14 out of 18 
estimates are positive. Furthermore, for the value-weighted measure, all negative estimates are 
statistically insignificant. A total of 26 out of 37 estimates are statistically significant at least at the 
10% level. The binomial likelihoods of observing the sign distributions if there is no effect are very 
low: 3.2% (EW) and 0.4% (VW), combined less than 0.2%. 
The inter-country evidence clearly suggests that stock return synchronicity is generally higher 
between the countries after joining the EU or the euro area, or when the level of economic and 
financial integration increases. 
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Table 11  
Stock synchronicity and joining the European Union (Inter-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+",$ + ,	*-./",$ + 3	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+",$ is a binary variable which is 
0 when the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after the country has joined the EU, and *-./",$ is a 
similar binary variable which is 0 when the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after the country has joined 
the euro area. The coefficient ( is expected to be positive. Only the equally weighted synchronicity measure 
is reported due to the mismatch of the joining dates and available index data for the relevant countries. In 
addition, the binomial probability for the null hypothesis that both signs are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW 
Austria 0,014 (0,727) 	
Bulgaria -0,026 (0,072) *	
Croatia -0,001 (0,959) 	
Cyprus 0,051 (0,027) *	
Czech 0,052 (0,001) ***	
Estonia 0,066 (0,003) **	
Finland 0,122 (0,005) ** 
Hungary 0,078 (0,000) ***	
Latvia -0,051 (0,028) *	
Lithuania -0,011 (0,595) 	
Malta -0,002 (0,936)  
Poland 0,107 (0,000) *** 
Slovakia 0,045 (0,030) *	
Slovenia 0,024 (0,175) 	
Sweden 0,098 (0,000) ***	
N (total) 15   
N (success) 10   
P 0,06   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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Table 12  
Stock synchronicity and joining the euro area (Inter-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients c and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+",$ + ,	*-./",$ + 3	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+",$ is a binary variable which is 
0 when the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after the country has joined the EU, and *-./",$ is a 
similar binary variable which is 0 when the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after the country has joined 
the euro area. The coefficient , is expected to be positive. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted 
synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, the binomial probability for the null hypothesis that both 
signs are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
Austria 0,036 (0,307)   0,082 (0,026) * 
Belgium 0,023 (0,429) 	 	 0,148 (0,000) ***	
Cyprus -0,022 (0,417) 	 	 -0,001 (0,975)  
Estonia 0,003 (0,918)   -0,013 (0,237)  
Finland 0,120 (0,006) **	 	 0,140 (0,013) *	
France 0,168 (0,000) ***	 	 0,228 (0,000) ***	
Germany 0,084 (0,012) *	 	 0,151 (0,000) *** 
Greece 0,069 (0,000) ***  0,137 (0,000) *** 
Ireland 0,070 (0,000) ***	 	 0,119 (0,000) ***	
Italy 0,181 (0,000) ***  0,189 (0,000) *** 
Latvia 0,066 (0,152)   0,035 (0,081) * 
Lithuania -0,065 (0,025) *  -0,034 (0,399)  
Luxembourg 0,084 (0,000) ***	 	 NA NA  
Malta -0,034 (0,077) *	 	 -0,002 (0,889) 	
Netherlands 0,176 (0,000) ***	 	 0,177 (0,000) ***	
Portugal 0,083 (0,000) ***	 	 0,141 (0,000) ***	
Slovakia -0,042 (0,031) *	 	 0,004 (0,691) 	
Slovenia -0,041 (0,029) *  0,031 (0,119) 	
Spain -0,020 (0,067) *	   0,202 (0,000) ***	
N (total) 19    18   
N (success) 13    14   
P 0,03    0,00   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10%  
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4.5.2 Intra-country synchronicity 
Next, let us consider synchronicity inside the country. Now, !",$ in equation 22 is the intra-country 
stock return synchronicity based on the returns of individual stocks and the equally or value-weighted 
market index. The coefficients ( and , are expected to be significant, but hypothesis 6 expects that 
the sign of the coefficients depends on the country. 
Table 13 reports the results for joining the EU. Again, only equally weighted results are presented for 
joining the EU due to data availability in relation to the joining dates. Out of the 15 estimates, 8 are 
positive and 7 are negative. However, 12 of the 15 estimates are significant at least at the 10% level. 
Seven are significant at the 0.1% level, two at the 1% level, and three more at least at the 10% level. 
While the average slope estimate is positive (0.041), the direction of the effect clearly depends on the 
country. On the other hand, the effect is generally statistically significant. 
Table 14 reports the effect of joining the euro area. Both the equally weighted and the value-weighted 
measure of synchronicity are examined, since the dates of joining the euro are generally later than 
those for joining the EU. As discussed earlier in section 2.2, the average period between joining the 
EU and joining the euro area has been nearly six years, allowing for a sufficiently long sample before 
and after the joining date for the value-weighted indices as well. In total, 19 countries adopted the 
euro during the sample period. Out of these, 8 estimates have a positive sign when using the equally 
weighted synchronicity measure, and 10 out of 18 estimates have a positive sign when using the 
value-weighted synchronicity measure. As with the effect of joining the EU, a clear direction for the 
influence on stock synchronicity cannot be distinguished. For the equally weighted measure, 12 out 
of 19 estimates are statistically significant: four at the 0.1% level, three at the 1% level, and five at 
least at the 10% level. For the value-weighted measure, 10 out of 18 are statistically significant: six 
at the 0.1% level, two at the 1% level, and two at least at the 10% level. While the direction of the 
effect depends on the country, for at least half of the countries the effect is statistically significant. 
The evidence is consistent with the notion that the direction of the effect depends on the country. On 
the one hand, the integration exposes the stocks to the same systematic factors, leading to higher 
synchronicity. On the other hand, the variation in the new systematic factors may be lower, as 
common European policy may be more stable than the country policy. Moreover, joining the EU has 
rigorous requirements, which can have such positive effects on the maturity of the financial market 
in the country that stock return synchronicity may decline. 
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Table 13 
Stock synchronicity and joining the European Union (Intra-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+",$ + ,	*-./",$ + 3	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+",$ is a binary variable which is 
0 when the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after the country has joined the EU, and *-./",$ is a 
similar binary variable which is 0 when the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after the country has joined 
the euro area. Only the equally weighted synchronicity measure is reported due to the mismatch of the joining 
dates and available index data for the relevant countries. In addition, the binomial probability for the null 
hypothesis that both signs are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW 
Austria -0,375 (0,000) ***	
Bulgaria -0,511 (0,000) ***	
Croatia 0,224 (0,080) *	
Cyprus -0,407 (0,000) ***	
Czech 0,360 (0,000) ***	
Estonia 0,336 (0,008) **	
Finland -0,146 (0,113)  
Hungary 0,471 (0,000) ***	
Latvia -0,780 (0,000) ***	
Lithuania -0,276 (0,043) *	
Malta -0,128 (0,297)  
Poland 0,057 (0,482)  
Slovakia 0,795 (0,008) **	
Slovenia 0,709 (0,000) ***	
Sweden 0,292 (0,039) *	
N (total) 15   
N (success) 8   
P 0,30   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10%  
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Table 14 
Stock synchronicity and joining the euro area (Intra-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients c and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	*+",$ + ,	*-./",$ + 3	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and *+",$ is a binary variable which is 
0 when the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after the country has joined the EU, and *-./",$ is a 
similar binary variable which is 0 when the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after the country has joined 
the euro area. Both the equally weighted and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, 
the binomial probability for the null hypothesis that both signs are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
Austria -0,022 (0,719)   0,027 (0,541)  
Belgium -0,194 (0,002) **	 	 0,140 (0,001) ***	
Cyprus -0,150 (0,025) *	 	 -0,050 (0,388)  
Estonia -0,102 (0,503)   0,006 (0,930)  
Finland 0,221 (0,000) ***	 	 0,251 (0,000) ***	
France 0,088 (0,021) *	 	 0,074 (0,010) *	
Germany -0,131 (0,010) **	 	 -0,045 (0,292)  
Greece -0,065 (0,257)   -0,088 (0,129)  
Ireland -0,161 (0,010) *	 	 0,200 (0,000) ***	
Italy 0,035 (0,497)   -0,007 (0,883)  
Latvia 0,010 (0,950)   0,018 (0,837)  
Lithuania -0,084 (0,115)   -0,159 (0,183)  
Luxembourg 0,404 (0,082) *	 	 NA NA  
Malta -0,229 (0,006) **	 	 -0,207 (0,001) ***	
Netherlands 0,265 (0,000) ***	 	 0,199 (0,003) **	
Portugal 0,110 (0,081) *	 	 0,198 (0,000) ***	
Slovakia -1,690 (0,000) ***	 	 0,572 (0,000) ***	
Slovenia 0,138 (0,364)   -0,322 (0,089) *	
Spain -0,459 (0,000) ***	   -0,141 (0,005) **	
N (total) 19    18   
N (success) 8    10   
P 0,68    0,24   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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4.6 The relative strength of the effects of joining the European Union or the euro area 
To examine the relative strength of the effects, I perform a standard Z-test for the difference in means 
in the two result sets. The average absolute coefficient value for the intra-country effect of joining 
the EU is 0.39 (EW), while the average absolute coefficient value for joining the euro area is 0.24 
(EW). However, the Z-score for the difference in means is only 0,78. Therefore, while the intra-
country effect is on average 63% stronger for joining the EU, this is not nearly statistically significant. 
On the other hand, for the inter-country effect of joining the EU, the average absolute coefficient 
value is 0.05 (EW), while the respective average for joining the euro area is 0.07 (EW). Interestingly, 
based on the averages, the effect of joining the euro area seems to be approximately 40% higher. The 
Z-score for the difference in the means is 1,88, so this difference is also statistically significant. In 
contrast to the hypothesis, it seems that adopting the euro may actually have a stronger effect on inter-
country synchronicity than joining the EU. 
The hypothesis is largely based on the view that the political systems of the countries get more 
integrated when the new member state joins the EU, and that the commitment to join the euro area as 
well has to be made at the same time. Since part of the information of adopting the euro is revealed 
already at this point, part of the asset pricing shock should also be seen at this point. However, the 
evidence suggests that the synchronicity between the countries may actually be more affected by 
joining the euro than joining the EU. It seems that the actual implementation of the currency 
integration taking place after officially joining the euro area is more relevant to investors than merely 
the theoretical moment when the information is revealed. However, this is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the informational reasoning. If the shock related to adopting the common currency is observed 
in two parts, first when joining the EU and second when the currency integration is implemented, the 
latter may be so much stronger than the former that it is actually observed greater than the former 
combined with the shock related to joining the EU. The evidence seems to support this view that a 
common currency is a clearly greater integrator of the financial markets than the integration of 
political institutions or general economic guidelines as such. 
4.7 Stock return synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and the integration of the European Union 
Finally, I investigate how the European integration affects the influence of policy uncertainty on stock 
return synchronicity. According to hypothesis 8, the effect of the general European policy uncertainty 
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should be higher after the country has joined the EU or the euro area, since the political systems will 
be much more tightly joined. To examine the hypothesis, I run the following regressions:  
!",$ = & + (	7+89:;<=,$	*+",$ + ,	7+89:;<=,$ + 3	*+",$ + 0	!",$45 + 0$	, 
!",$ = & + (	7+89:;<=,$	*-./",$ + ,	7+89:;<=,$ + 3	*-./",$ + 0	!",$45 + 0$	, 
where !",$ is the synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, 7+89:;<=,$ is the European policy 
uncertainty index, *+",$ is a binary variable which is 0 when the country is not a member of the EU 
and 1 after the country has joined the EU, and *-./",$ is a similar binary variable which is 0 when 
the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after the country has joined the euro area. According to 
the hypothesis, the coefficient ( is expected to be positive. 
First, let us examine the effect on intra-country synchronicity. Table 15 reports the estimates for the 
state-dependency on joining the EU. Again, only the equally-weighted synchronicity measure is 
reported due to the availability of index data in relation to the joining dates. Out of 15 estimates, nine 
have the expected positive sign, but only three are statistically significant. Table 16 presents the 
estimates for the state-dependency on joining the euro area. For the equally weighted synchronicity 
measure, 12 out of 19 estimates have the expected positive sign, while none of the estimates are 
statistically significant. For the value-weighted measure, 11 out of 18 estimates are positive as 
expected, but only five are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. 
While the binomial probabilities for observing such sign distributions for the estimates are somewhat 
low if there is no effect, it is clear that generally the coefficients are not statistically significant. Even 
though the sign distributions support the view that policy uncertainty would have a stronger effect on 
synchronicity when the level of integration is higher, the empirical evidence provides no support for 
the statistical significance of this state-dependency.  
Second, consider the effect on inter-country synchronicity. Table 17 presents the coefficients for the 
state-dependency on joining the EU, and table 18 presents the estimates for the state-dependency on 
joining the euro area. Generally, the results provide very little support for the hypothesis that policy 
uncertainty has a stronger effect on synchronicity when the level of integration is higher.  
(23) 
(24) 
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Table 15  
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and joining the European Union (Intra-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	7+89:;<=,$	*+",$ + ,	7+89:;<=,$ + 3	*+",$ + 0	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and 7+89:;<=,$ is the European policy 
uncertainty index, *+",$ is a binary variable which is 0 when the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after 
the country has joined the EU. The coefficient ( is expected to be positive. The equally weighted and 
synchronicity measure is reported. In addition, the binomial probability for the null hypothesis that both signs 
are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW 
Austria 0,0031 (0,052) *	
Bulgaria 0,0004 (0,844) 	
Croatia 0,0008 (0,776) 	
Cyprus -0,0003 (0,891) 	
Czech -0,0015 (0,135) 	
Estonia 0,0011 (0,609) 	
Finland -0,0022 (0,194)  
Hungary 0,0011 (0,496) 	
Latvia -0,0006 (0,742) 	
Lithuania 0,0027 (0,213) 	
Malta 0,0009 (0,670)  
Poland 0,0016 (0,338)  
Slovakia -0,0096 (0,016) *	
Slovenia 0,0006 (0,803) 	
Sweden -0,0048 (0,022) *	
N (total) 15   
N (success) 8   
P 0,30   
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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Table 16  
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and joining the euro area (Intra-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	7+89:;<=,$	*-./",$ + ,	7+89:;<=,$ + 3	*-./",$ + 0	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the intra-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and 7+89:;<=,$ is the European policy 
uncertainty index, *-./",$ is a binary variable which is 0 when the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after 
the country has joined the euro area. The coefficient ( is expected to be positive. Both the equally weighted 
and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, the binomial probability for the null 
hypothesis that both signs are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
Austria 0,000 (0,315)   0,001 (0,498)  
Belgium 0,000 (0,893)   0,001 (0,443)  
Cyprus 0,000 (0,948)   0,003 (0,179)  
Estonia 0,000 (0,791)   -0,002 (0,292)  
Finland 0,000 (0,745)   0,002 (0,216)  
France 0,000 (0,142)   0,002 (0,007) **	
Germany 0,000 (0,512)   0,002 (0,068) *	
Greece 0,000 (0,479)   0,001 (0,645)  
Ireland 0,000 (0,478)   0,000 (0,841)  
Italy 0,000 (0,155)   0,003 (0,037) *	
Latvia 0,000 (0,524)   0,000 (0,964)  
Lithuania -0,001 (0,255)   -0,018 (0,059) *	
Luxembourg 0,001 (0,266)   NA NA  
Malta 0,000 (0,859)   0,002 (0,278)  
Netherlands 0,000 (0,619)   0,003 (0,127)  
Portugal 0,000 (0,368)   0,002 (0,105)  
Slovakia 0,000 (0,362)   -0,001 (0,691)  
Slovenia 0,000 (0,399)   -0,005 (0,014) *	
Spain 0,000 (0,227) 		   -0,001 (0,641) 		
N (total) 19    18   
N (success) 12    11   
P 0,08    0,12   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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Table 17  
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and joining the European Union (Inter-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	7+89:;<=,$	*+",$ + ,	7+89:;<=,$ + 3	*+",$ + 0	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and 7+89:;<=,$ is the European policy 
uncertainty index, *+",$ is a binary variable which is 0 when the country is not a member of the EU and 1 after 
the country has joined the EU. The coefficient ( is expected to be positive. The equally weighted and 
synchronicity measure is reported. In addition, the binomial probability for the null hypothesis that both signs 
are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW 
Austria 0,0031 (0,052) *	
Bulgaria 0,0004 (0,844) 	
Croatia 0,0008 (0,776) 	
Cyprus -0,0003 (0,891) 	
Czech -0,0015 (0,135) 	
Estonia 0,0011 (0,609) 	
Finland -0,0022 (0,194)  
Hungary 0,0011 (0,496) 	
Latvia -0,0006 (0,742) 	
Lithuania 0,0027 (0,213) 	
Malta 0,0009 (0,670)  
Poland 0,0016 (0,338)  
Slovakia -0,0096 (0,016) *	
Slovenia 0,0006 (0,803) 	
Sweden -0,0048 (0,022) *	
N (total) 15   
N (success) 8   
P 0,30   
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10% 
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Table 18  
Stock synchronicity, policy uncertainty, and joining the euro area (Inter-country) 
 
This table reports the estimated slope coefficients b and their Newey-West p-values from the following 
regression: 
 !",$ = & + (	7+89:;<=,$	*-./",$ + ,	7+89:;<=,$ + 3	*-./",$ + 0	!",$45 + 0$ 
 
where !",$ is the inter-country synchronicity for country 1 for month 2, and 7+89:;<=,$ is the European policy 
uncertainty index, *-./",$ is a binary variable which is 0 when the country has not adopted the euro and 1 after 
the country has joined the euro area. The coefficient ( is expected to be positive. Both the equally weighted 
and value-weighted synchronicity measures are reported. In addition, the binomial probability for the null 
hypothesis that both signs are equally likely is reported. 
 
 
  EW   VW 
Austria 0,000 (0,315)   0,001 (0,498)  
Belgium 0,000 (0,893)   0,001 (0,443)  
Cyprus 0,000 (0,948)   0,003 (0,179)  
Estonia 0,000 (0,791)   -0,002 (0,292)  
Finland 0,000 (0,745)   0,002 (0,216)  
France 0,000 (0,142)   0,002 (0,007) **	
Germany 0,000 (0,512)   0,002 (0,068) *	
Greece 0,000 (0,479)   0,001 (0,645)  
Ireland 0,000 (0,478)   0,000 (0,841)  
Italy 0,000 (0,155)   0,003 (0,037) *	
Latvia 0,000 (0,524)   0,000 (0,964)  
Lithuania -0,001 (0,255)   -0,018 (0,059) *	
Luxembourg 0,001 (0,266)   NA NA  
Malta 0,000 (0,859)   0,002 (0,278)  
Netherlands 0,000 (0,619)   0,003 (0,127)  
Portugal 0,000 (0,368)   0,002 (0,105)  
Slovakia 0,000 (0,362)   -0,001 (0,691)  
Slovenia 0,000 (0,399)   -0,005 (0,014) *	
Spain 0,000 (0,227) 		   -0,001 (0,641) 		
N (total) 19    18   
N (success) 12    11   
P 0,08    0,12   
 
 
Significance indicators: *** 0,1%, ** 1%, * 10%  
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4.8 Subperiod analysis 
I perform subperiod analysis for all regressions except those including the events of joining the 
European Union and the euro area, since such one-time events are not suitable for subperiod 
examination. I divide the sample into two subsamples from 1990 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2015. In 
addition, I examine the sample divided into 5-year periods with the exception of the first period being 
6 years, since the full sample period is 26 years long. 
There is a clear pattern in the subperiod investigation: the signs of the estimates are on average 
consistent in the subsamples, and there are minor changes in the magnitude of the coefficients, but 
the statistical significance of the estimates decreases when the length of the sample period decreases. 
Therefore, the subperiod analysis does not reveal significant changes in the effects over time. 
The generally lower statistical significance of the subsample results is likely due to the reduced 
number of observations, especially since the estimates for the 5-year subperiods are on average the 
least significant. While the synchronicity measure itself is based on daily stock returns and is not 
affected, dividing the resulting monthly synchronicity time series into smaller periods reduces the 
number of observations drastically. The full sample covers 26 years, or 312 months. For a 5-year 
subperiod, the number of observations is merely 60. Therefore, it is not surprising that I find that the 
statistical significance of the results decreases when the subperiod length decreases.  
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5 Summary and conclusion 
The recent political and financial crises have raised questions about the significance of political 
uncertainty in financial markets, specifically policy uncertainty. Government policies have an impact 
on firm profitability, and thus uncertainty about the policies is relevant to investors. Clearly, since 
virtually all firms are exposed to government regulation and economic policy to some degree, this 
uncertainty cannot be diversified away. The prior literature on the asset pricing implications of policy 
uncertainty has focused on using political elections as a proxy for uncertainty resolution, but the 
recent introduction of continuous measures of policy uncertainty allows for investigating also the 
periods between elections. 
My paper examines the influence of policy uncertainty on the degree of stock price co-movement in 
the European Union. The EU is becoming increasingly integrated, political power is centralized, and 
the general level of political uncertainty seems to be rising. Thus, centralized policy decisions are 
affecting a larger number of countries and investors than ever before. Furthermore, the growing 
integration may intuitively be expected to increase stock market co-movement between the countries, 
as the importance of common, non-diversifiable political and economic factors is growing. Moreover, 
a common currency, the euro, is tightly integrating the financial systems of the countries. The greater 
integration may have multiple implications for firms and investors. Higher stock return synchronicity 
implies that investors are less able to diversify their portfolios, as more stocks are required to reach 
enough return variation, since there is less firm-specific variation. Higher synchronicity may also be 
indicative of market inefficiency (Roll, 1988), and hinder the effectiveness of corporate governance 
measures (Morck at al., 1988). 
I base my empirical examination on a sample of 27 current EU member states14 and 26 years of daily 
stock returns from January 1990 to December 2015. Following the earlier literature, I use the >? 
statistic from a simple market model regression as a measure of synchronicity (e.g. Roll, 1988). To 
proxy for policy uncertainty, I used the recent economic policy uncertainty index based on newspaper 
articles, developed by Baker et al. (2015). 
                                                
14 I exclude Romania due to the availability and quality of data. 
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I find empirical support for multiple implications of the theoretical work of Pástor and Veronesi 
(2012, 2013). First, the evidence suggests that economic policy uncertainty is generally higher when 
economic conditions are weaker. This is intuitive, since in bad economic conditions the government 
is expected to act in order to fix the situation, while in good economic conditions policy changes are 
less likely. This result is also clearly applicable to the European crisis situation during the recent 
years. Second, I find that stock return synchronicity increases with economic policy uncertainty. This 
holds for both individual country-level policy uncertainty and common European policy uncertainty, 
as well as for both intra-country and inter-country stock return synchronicity. Especially the inter-
country synchronicity increases with the level of common European policy uncertainty.  
Following the first two, synchronicity is expected to be higher when economic conditions are worse. 
However, I find only dubious support for this prediction: the effect is highly dependent on the country, 
in both direction and significance. For some countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands, the intra-country synchronicity is higher when GDP growth is lower. On the other hand, 
for Greece and Cyprus, the intra-country synchronicity seems to be lower when economic conditions 
are weaker. Considering inter-country synchronicity and economic conditions, the examination with 
GDP growth provides some support for the view that synchronicity increases when economic 
conditions decline, but when using the the Economic Sentiment Indicator or the Business Climate 
Indicator as proxies for economic conditions, there is no observable association. 
Furthermore, the equilibrium model of Pástor and Veronesi (2013) suggests that the effect of policy 
uncertainty on synchronicity is higher when economic conditions are lower. On average, I find no 
support for this state-dependency in Europe. 
Next, I hypothesize that both joining the European Union and later adopting the euro lead to 
integration shocks that affect stock return synchronicity. Since the individual countries are affected 
to a higher degree by the same new factors, I argue that inter-country synchronicity should be higher 
after joining the EU or the euro area. Such new systematic factors are imposed for instance through 
the regulation and policy decisions of the common European institutions. In support of the hypothesis, 
the empirical evidence clearly suggests that stock return synchronicity is generally higher between 
countries after joining the EU or the euro area. Furthermore, I find that the effect observed when 
joining the euro area is on average 40% higher than that of joining the EU. This implies that a common 
currency is a more important factor in the financial markets than general political of economic 
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integration. This is further supported by the fact that a country has to commit to joining the euro area 
already when joining the EU, and thus part of the shock related to joining the euro area actually 
coincides with joining the EU. If even then the remaining shock observed at the time of joining the 
euro area is higher than the two former shocks combined, the currency integration is clearly more 
important than the general political or economic integration. 
Inside the countries, the effect is intuitively less clear. On the one hand, synchronicity may rise when 
new factors common to all stocks increase. Again, such factors may be introduced, for instance, by 
the regulation and economic policy imposed by the common European institutions. On the other hand, 
if those new factors show less variation than the old ones, it may actually be that the total variation 
in the systematic factors declines, thus leading to lower synchronicity. Intuitively, it may be that the 
policy of the common European institutions is more stable than the policy of the individual 
governments of some countries. Furthermore, earlier literature suggests that synchronicity is lower in 
more developed markets (e.g. Morck et al., 2000). Then, if the rigorous requirements of joining the 
EU significantly develop the economic and financial systems of the joining country, we may also see 
a negative shock in synchronicity. Consistent with the existence of multiple contemporaneous effects, 
the empirical evidence suggests that while both joining the EU or the euro area generally have a 
significant effect on synchronicity, the direction of the effect clearly depends on the country. 
Furthermore, I find that there is no significant difference in the magnitude of the two shocks in 
synchronicity inside the countries, as opposed to the inter-country effects discussed above. 
While I document the country-dependency of the influence that economic and financial integration 
has on stock return synchronicity inside the country, and provide some feasible intuition behind it, 
further investigation is required to reach credible conclusions. Clearly, there are multiple 
simultaneous effects depending on multiple underlying factors. However, the economic policy 
uncertainty index data that I use in the empirical examination is not sufficient to investigate the levels 
of policy stability in the individual countries and in the common European institutions. In addition, 
further research is required to quantify how much the economic and financial systems of each of the 
joining countries has developed, and whether any such developments in market maturity are 
associated with stock return synchronicity, as suggested by the earlier literature. 
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Finally, I examine whether the influence of the common European policy uncertainty on stock return 
synchronicity grows with the integration of the EU. However, the empirical evidence provides very 
little support for this state-dependency. 
In conclusion, I show that there is a significant relation between stock return synchronicity, economic 
policy uncertainty, and the growing integration of the European Union. Generally, I find that stock 
return synchronicity in the EU increases with both economic policy uncertainty and the level of 
integration, especially between the member states. 
My paper suggests at least two directions for further research. First, the direction of the relationship 
between the growing economic integration and intra-country stock return synchronicity is highly 
country-dependent. The reasons for this country-dependency are not clear, and merit further 
investigation. Second, while a smaller avenue, the results on the relative importance of joining the 
EU and later adopting the euro prompt a question on whether simply a common currency is more 
important to the financial markets than general political and economic integration. 
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